Category: Energy Economics

Economics of the Environment

The seventh edition of Economics of the Environment: Selected Readings has just been published by Edward Elgar Publishing, and I’m pleased to bring this new volume to your attention.  The book is a compendium of some of the best and most timely articles by a dream team of environmental economists.  Previous editions have served as a valuable supplement to environmental economics text books or as a stand-alone reference book of key, up-to-date readings from the field.  In addition to being valuable for anyone studying environmental economics, environmental policy, or climate change policy, the book can be a useful resource for practitioners in government, private industry, as well as advocacy groups and other NGOs working on environmental policy.

In today’s essay, I first describe the background and motivation for the book, summarize its contents – chapter by chapter, highlight its key messages, and then conclude with some reflections and an invitation.

Background and Motivation

Environmental and natural resource problems are both more widespread and more important today than they were 100 years ago when the discipline of modern economics was marking its emergence with the publication of the first volume of the American Economic Review. A century of economic growth and globalization have brought unparalleled improvements in societal well-being, but also unprecedented challenges to the carrying capacity of the planet. Increases in income and population that would have been inconceivable 100 years ago have greatly heightened pressures on the natural environment.

The stocks of a variety of renewable natural resources – including water, forests, fisheries, and numerous other species of plant and animal – have been depleted below socially-efficient levels, principally because of market failures. Open-access – whether characterized as externalities or public goods – have led to the degradation of air and water quality, inappropriate disposal of hazardous waste, depletion of stratospheric ozone, and the atmospheric accumulation of greenhouse gases linked with global climate change.

Over the same century, economics as a discipline has gradually come to focus more and more attention on these problems, first considering natural resources and subsequently environmental quality. Economic research within academia and think tanks has improved our understanding of the causes and consequences of excessive resource depletion and inefficient environmental degradation, and thereby has helped identify sensible policy solutions.

Despite the generally positive influence economics has had on policy, the problems have overall not diminished, and the lag between understanding and action can be long. While some environmental problems have been addressed successfully, others continue to emerge. Some, such as the threat of global climate change, are both more consequential and more difficult than problems of the past. Fortunately, economics is well positioned to offer better understanding and better policies to address these new and ongoing challenges.

The Book

Approximately six years have passed since the previous edition of this volume was published, and it is now close to 50 years since the first edition appeared in 1972, edited by Robert and Nancy Dorfman. I have had the pleasure of editing the fourth (2000), fifth (2005), sixth (2012), and now the seventh edition (2019) of this book. Whereas the first six editions were published by W.W. Norton & Company, the new edition has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

Over this span of time, environmental economics has evolved from what was once a relatively obscure application of welfare economics to a prominent field of economics in its own right. The number of articles on the natural environment appearing in mainstream economics periodicals has continued to increase, as has the number of economics journals dedicated exclusively to environmental and resource topics.

There has also been a proliferation of environmental economics textbooks. Many are excellent, but none can be expected to provide direct access to timely and original contributions by the field’s leading scholars. As most teachers of economics recognize, it is valuable to supplement the structure and rigor of a text with original readings from the literature.

With that in mind, this new volume consists of 34 chapters that instructors will find to be of tremendous value as a complement to their chosen text and their lectures. The scope is comprehensive, the list of authors is a veritable “who’s who” of environmental economics, and the articles are timely, with more than 94 percent published since 1990, and well more than a third published over the past five years. Overall, more than half of the chapters are new to this edition.

In order to make these readings broadly accessible, one criterion I used in the selection process is that articles should not only be original and well written – and meet the highest standards of economic scholarship – but also be non-technical in their presentations. Hence, readers will find little or no formal mathematics in the book’s 688 pages.

The 34 chapters are grouped into nine parts of the book:  (1) Overview; (2) Costs and Benefits of Environmental Protection; (3) Assessing the Goals of Environmental Policy:  Economic Efficiency and Benefit-Cost Analysis; (4) The Means of Environmental Policy:  Cost-Effectiveness and Market-Based Instruments; (5) Economics of Natural Resources; (6) Global Climate Change; (7) Sustainability, the Commons, and Globalization; (8) Behavioral Economics and the Environment; and (9) Economics and Environmental Policy Making.

Overview

Part I of the volume provides an overview of the field and a review of its foundations. Don Fullerton and I (Chapter 1) start things off with a brief essay about how economists think about the environment. This is followed by the classic treatment of social costs and bargaining by Ronald Coase (Chapter 2).

Costs and Benefits of Environmental Protection

Part II examines the costs and benefits of environmental protection. It begins with an article by Antoine Dechezleprêtre and Misato Sato (Chapter 3) that examines an often-controversial area, namely the theory and empirical evidence regarding the relationship between environmental regulation and so-called “competitiveness.” The remainder of Part II focuses on the other, more challenging side of the analytic ledger – the benefits of environmental protection. This is an area that has been even more contentious, both in the policy world and among scholars. Here the core question is whether and how environmental amenities can be valued in economic terms for analytical purposes. Trudy Cameron (Chapter 4) provides a valuable guide to a concept that is both important in assessments of the benefits of environmental regulations and is also widely misunderstood – the value of a statistical life. Then we turn to a provocative debate on the stated-preference method known as “contingent valuation,” including two supportive essays – by Richard Carson (Chapter 5) and by Catherine Kling, Daniel Phaneuf, and Jinhua Zhao (Chapter 6) – followed by a critique by Jerry Hausman (Chapter 7).

Assessing the Goals of Environmental Policy:  Economic Efficiency and Benefit-Cost Analysis

There are two principal policy questions that need to be addressed in the environmental realm: how much environmental protection is desirable; and how should that degree of environmental protection be achieved?

In Part III, the criterion of economic efficiency and the analytical tool of benefit–cost (net present value) analysis are considered as ways of assessing the goals of environmental policies. In an introductory essay, Kenneth Arrow and his co-authors (Chapter 8) ask whether there is a role for such analysis to play in environmental, health, and safety regulation. Then, Lawrence Goulder and I (Chapter 9) focus on a key ingredient of benefit–cost analysis that non-economists often find confusing or even troubling – intertemporal discounting. Next, Kenneth Arrow and another set of co-authors (Chapter 10) focus on the possibility of a declining discount rate, which can be very important for analyzing long-term phenomenon, such as climate change. Finally, Ted Gayer and Kip Viscusi (Chapter 11) provide a critique of what they perceive to be the ways in which the principles of benefit–cost analysis have been abused in some regulatory impacts analyses carried out by the federal government.

The Means of Environmental Policy:  Cost Effectiveness and Market-Based Instruments

Part IV examines the policy instruments – the means – that can be employed to achieve environmental targets or goals. This is an area where economists have made their greatest inroads of influence in the policy world, with tremendous changes over the past 30 years in the reception given by politicians and policy makers to so-called market-based or economic-incentive instruments for environmental protection. Richard Schmalensee and I (Chapter 12) start things off by identifying lessons that have been learned from three decades of experience with cap-and-trade systems in Europe and the United States. In the next chapter, Schmalensee and I (Chapter 13) examine the ironic history of one particularly important application – the SO2 allowance trading system, enacted by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The following article, by Karen Fisher-Vanden and Sheila Olmstead (Chapter 14), recognizes that virtually all prominent applications of emissions trading systems have been for air pollutants of various types, and examines the opportunities and challenges of using such instruments to address water quality problems.

Economics of Natural Resources

Part V consists of four essays on the economics of natural resources, beginning with Robert Solow’s classic, intuitive explication of Harold Hotelling’s seminal contribution to the economic theory of nonrenewable natural resources (Chapter 15). A natural extension is provided by Thomas Covert, Michael Greenstone, and Christopher Knittel (Chapter 16) in an article in which they ask whether market forces of supply and demand will lead to severe reductions in the use of fossil fuels. Then Sheila Olmstead (Chapter 17) applies similar thinking to the management of water resources, and Severin Borenstein (Chapter 18) examines the economics of renewable electricity generation.

Global Climate Change

The next four sections of the book treat a set of timely and important topics and problems. Part VI is dedicated to analysis of economic dimensions of global climate change, which appears to be the most significant environmental problem that has yet arisen, both in terms of its potential damages and in terms of the costs of addressing it. First, a broad overview of the topic is provided in a survey article by Joseph Aldy, Alan Krupnick, Richard Newell, Ian Parry, and William Pizer (Chapter 19). Next, William Nordhaus (Chapter 20) critiques the well-known Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, and Nicholas Stern and Chris Taylor (Chapter 21) respond. Following this, Richard Newell, William Pizer, and Daniel Raimi (Chapter 22) examine what was accomplished with the use of carbon markets in various parts of the world in the 15 years after the global climate agreement known as the Kyoto Protocol. Of course, after Kyoto, the next major global agreement in this realm was the landmark Paris Agreement of 2015. Daniel Bodansky, Seth Hoedl, Gilbert Metcalf, and I (Chapter 23) analyze how linking heterogeneous national policies can lower the cost of achieving national targets and thereby facilitate increased ambition under the Paris Agreement. Finally, Richard Tol (Chapter 24) turns from the cost side to the benefit side of climate policy by examining the anticipated economic impacts of unabated climate change.

Sustainability, the Commons, and Globalization

Part VII examines another important area of exploration in environmental economics: sustainability, the commons, and globalization. Robert Solow (Chapter 25) begins with an economic perspective on sustainability. This is followed by Elinor Ostrom’s development of a general framework for analyzing sustainability (Chapter 26), and my own historical view of economic analysis of problems associated with open-access resources (Chapter 27). Then, we turn to the topic of corporate social responsibility and the environment, discussion of which has too often been characterized by more heat than light. Forest Reinhardt, Richard Vietor, and I (Chapter 28) provide an economic perspective by examining the notion of firms voluntarily sacrificing profits in the social interest. The essays in the book can apply in the context of a diverse set of countries, but developing countries face a special set of challenges. So, this section closes with Michael Greenstone and Kelsey Jack (Chapter 29) providing a broad examination of the relationship between economic development and environmental protection.

Behavioral Economics and the Environment

Next, in Part VIII, we feature applications of the emerging area of behavioral economics to environmental issues, beginning with an overview of this terrain by Jason Shogren and Laura Taylor (Chapter 30). Then, Cass Sunstein and Lucia Reisch (Chapter 31) examine the implications of behavioral economics for the types of public policies that are most likely to be effective. Lastly, a specific application of behavioral economics to environmental questions is considered by Todd Gerarden, Richard Newell, and myself (Chapter 32), as we examine potential explanations for the so-called “energy paradox” or “energy efficiency gap” – the apparent reality that energy-efficiency technologies that would more than justify their upfront costs through life-cycle energy-cost savings are nevertheless not adopted.

Economics and Environmental Policy Making

The final section of the book, Part IX, departs from the normative concerns of much of the volume to examine some interesting and important questions of political economy. It turns out that an economic perspective can provide useful insights into questions that might at first seem fundamentally political. Myrick Freeman (Chapter 33) reflects on the benefits that U.S. environmental policies have brought about since the first Earth Day in 1970. And Robert Hahn (Chapter 34) addresses the question that many of the articles in this volume raise: what impact has economics actually had on environmental policy?

Key Messages

Preparing the various editions of this book has caused me to review hundreds of articles, and this has allowed me to identify some common themes that have emerged. First, there is the value – or at least, the potential value – of economic analysis of environmental policy. The cause of virtually all environmental problems in a market economy is economic behavior (that is, imperfect markets affected by externalities), and so economics offers a powerful lens through which to view environmental problems, and therefore a potentially effective set of analytical tools for designing and evaluating environmental policies.

A second message, connected with the first, is the specific value of benefit–cost analysis for helping to promote efficient policies. Economic efficiency ought to be one of the key criteria for evaluating proposed and existing environmental policies. Despite its limitations, benefit–cost analysis can be useful for consistently assimilating the disparate information that is pertinent to sound decision making. If properly done, it can be of considerable help to public officials when they seek to establish or assess environmental policies.

Third, the means governments use to achieve environmental objectives matter greatly. Different policy instruments have very different implications in terms of both benefits and costs, including abatement costs in both the short and the long term. Market-based instruments can enable the minimization of these costs.

Fourth, an economic perspective is also of value when reflecting on the use of natural resources, whether land, water, fisheries, or forests. Excessive rates of depletion are frequently due to the nature of the respective property-rights regimes, in particular, common property and open-access. Economic instruments – such as ITQ systems in the case of fisheries – can and have been employed to bring harvesting rates down to socially efficient levels.

Fifth and finally, policies for addressing global climate change, linked with emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, can benefit greatly from the application of economic thinking. On the one hand, the long time-horizon of climate change, the profound uncertainty in quantitative links between emissions and actual damages, and the possibility of catastrophic climate change present significant challenges to conventional economic analysis. But, at the same time, the ubiquity of energy generation and use in modern economies means that only market-based policies – essentially carbon-pricing regimes – are feasible instruments for achieving truly meaningful emissions reductions. Hence, despite the challenges, an economic perspective on this grandest of environmental threats is essential.

Reflections and an Invitation

Environmental economics is a rapidly evolving field. Not only do new theoretical models and improved empirical methods appear on a regular basis, but entirely new areas of investigation open up when the natural sciences indicate new concerns or the policy world turns to new issues. Therefore, this volume of collected essays remains a work in progress. I owe a great debt of gratitude to the teachers, students, and other readers of previous editions who have sent their comments and suggestions for revisions. Thanks are also due to Patrick Behrer, who provided superb research assistance in producing this Seventh Edition. Looking to future editions, I invite all readers – whether teachers, students, or practitioners – to send me your suggestions for improvement.

Share

Climate Negotiations in Poland Advanced Implementation of the Paris Agreement

During two weeks of sometimes boisterous plenary sessions and equally energetic backroom discussions, the 197 Parties of the Twenty-Fourth Conference of the Parties (COP-24) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), meeting in Katowice, Poland, sought to reach consensus on rules and guidelines for implementing the Paris Agreement.  That landmark 2015 accord came into force in 2016, and is scheduled to begin operations in earnest in 2020.  The fault lines at the Katowice negotiations were, as usual, largely between two groups:  the 43 industrialized countries, and the 154 developing nations.

Hanging over the negotiations was the reality that U.S. President Donald Trump announced in June 2017 that the United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement (in November, 2020, the soonest that any Party can actually withdraw).  Since Trump’s announcement, the former co-leadership by the United States and China, which had been critical to the passage of the Paris Agreement, has evolved into something between sole leadership by China and co-leadership by China and the European Union.

Not long before midnight on Saturday, December 15th, a full 24 hours after COP-24 was scheduled to conclude, consensus was reached on the 156-page Rulebook, with considerable credit due to the Polish presidency of the Conference (not to be confused with the presidency of the Polish nation), in the person of Michał Kurtyka, Poland’s Deputy Minister of Energy. As Jean Chemnick wrote in E&E News, the Rulebook represents a transition from an “idealized expression of world solidarity” in the Paris Agreement to a “set of mechanisms that countries hope will deliver results.”

But was COP-24 Really a Success?

A simple “yes” or “no” response to this question would be misleading.  There were literally dozens of aspects of the Paris Agreement on which the delegates to the Katowice meetings wanted to make progress by filling in details in the 29 articles of the skeletal Paris Agreement.  In my mind, two areas stood out.  One is referred to as “transparency,” and other is characterized (somewhat inaccurately) as “markets.”  Combining the achievements and lack thereof on both fronts, I assess the outcome of the Katowice talks to be more than a half-full glass of water (or wine, if you prefer).

First of Two Key Issues:  Transparency

Transparency refers to the credibility of each nation’s measurement of its own performance – in terms of its emissions and its policies.  The Paris Agreement gave significant wiggle room to the vast majority of countries – the 154 developing countries – by granting them flexibility in meeting the transparency requirements (which were to be established for the industrialized countries).  The U.S. delegation – consisting of civil servants led by long-time State Department official Trigg Talley – again worked closely with the Chinese delegation to foster a remarkable consensus that all countries must follow uniform standards for measuring emissions and tracking the achievement of their respect targets (Nationally Determined Contributions or NDCs).  This was a significant achievement, and a major step forward toward a level playing field among the countries of the world.

Conceivably, it could make it easier for the Trump administration to remain in the Paris Agreement (if the President were to become convinced that such action would be politically advantageous in the run-up to the November 2020 U.S. presidential election).  And, likewise, it will make it easier for a future (Democratic or Republican) administration to rejoin the Paris Agreement if the current President follows through on his promise to withdraw.  That is a significant success.

Second of Two Key Issues:  Article 6.2 and Carbon Markets

Turning to the second key set of issues at COP-24, I have frequently written that there are two necessary conditions for ultimate success of the Paris Agreement:  adequate scope of participation, and adequate ambition of the individual national contributions.  The first condition has surely been met, with 97% of global emissions associated with countries taking on responsibilities under Paris, compared with 14% under the current commitment period of the predecessor international agreement, the Kyoto Protocol of 1997.  But the factor that brought about such broad participation – namely, that each country’s target is anchored in its own national circumstances and colored by its domestic political reality – suggests that the individual contributions will not be collectively sufficient (due to the global commons nature of the problem).

Because of this, a key question has been whether there are ways that the Paris Agreement itself, as it is fleshed out, can enable and indeed facilitate increased ambition over time?  One answer, on which I have carried out extensive research with colleagues, can be provided by the linkage of regional, national, and sub-national policies – connections among policy systems that allow emission reduction efforts to be redistributed across systems.

Heterogeneous Linkage

Linkage is typically framed as between cap-and-trade systems, but regional, national, and sub-national policies will be highly heterogeneous, including a variety of types of emissions trading systems, carbon taxes, and conventional performance and technology standards.  As my research in this area with Michael Mehling (M.I.T.) and Gilbert Metcalf (Tufts University) has found, linkage among such heterogeneous policies is not trivial, but is – in many cases – feasible.

This is important because linkage fosters: cost savings by allowing firms to take advantage of lower cost abatement opportunities in other jurisdictions; improved functioning of markets by reducing market power and price volatility; political benefits to linking parties; administrative economies of scale; and – perhaps most important – the possibility of satisfying the UNFCCC’s key criterion of distributional equity – “common but differentiated responsibilities” – without sacrificing cost-effectiveness.

Fortunately, such linkage can be consistent with the Paris Agreement, under the authority of its Article 6, focused on international cooperation.  In particular, Article 6.2 provides for cooperative approaches among Parties, with Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) potentially serving as an accounting mechanism to ensure that international linkages do not result in double-counting or other errors when comparing each country’s emissions to its stated target.

So, What Happened in Katowice?

In Katowice, the delegates sought to write guidelines for Article 6 that could make its promise a reality.  Negotiators had an opportunity to define clear and consistent guidance for the accounting of emissions transfers under Article 6.2.  My view in advance of the Katowice talks was that a robust accounting framework for ITMO transfers could foster better linkage of climate policies across jurisdictions, but that if the guidance extended much beyond basic accounting rules, restrictive requirements could actually impede effective linkage, and be counter-productive.

In precisely this regard, two potential impediments arose in Katowice.  Proposals were introduced to place an explicit tax on ITMO transfers under the rubric of “Share of Proceeds,” meaning a payment by the transferring parties to a fund intended to help vulnerable developing countries meet their costs of adaptation to climate change.  Whereas the objective of financing adaptation has great merit, it is well covered and belongs in other parts of the Paris Agreement, not as a tax on trading.

The other potential impediment was in the form of proposals for an implicit tax on transfers, known as “Overall Mitigation in Global Emissions,” meaning that each transfer must result in a net reduction in overall emissions.  Again, increasing ambition over time is important, but that is dealt with appropriately in other parts of the Agreement, not by making it an implicit tax on market activity.

Last-Minute Maneuvers

As the end of the second week of negotiations approached, it appeared that both of these potential impediments might be finessed, if not completely avoided.  But then a single country – Brazil – decided to hold up the talks all night on the final Friday by insisting that it would not let there be any progress on rules for Article 6.2 unless the Conference agreed to state – under Article 6.4, viewed by most as an extension of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) – that it could use its large surplus of CDM credits (of questionable credibility) to help meet its Paris commitments in a manner that would have resulted in double-counting.  The Brazilian delegation refused to budge, and the result was that Article 6 was not included in the Katowice decision.  Rather, it was punted to COP-25, to be held next year in Santiago, Chile.

So, the outcome with this second issue was clearly not a great success, but was it a complete failure, or was it something in between?  This gets quite interesting.  On first blush, a lack of agreement on the rules of the road for Article 6.2 would seem to render ITMO transfers impossible – and hence reduce the scope for bilateral international linkages.

Does the Cloud Have a Silver Lining?

As Nathaniel Keohane (Environmental Defense Fund) has pointed out, countries can move ahead with international transfers even without guidance under Article 6.2, because that article is explicit that countries may use transferred mitigation outcomes toward meeting their national targets whether or not additional rules have been written.  The crucial phrase is that any transfer must be “consistent with guidance,” meaning that if guidance exists, it must be followed, but meaningful action does not depend on the existence of guidance.  Keohane indicates that this language was intentionally written into the Paris Agreement precisely because the United States and others feared that Brazil would try to hold Article 6.2 hostage to Article 6.4 — exactly as they did in Katowice.

I hope very much that Dr. Keohane’s interpretation is correct.  My lingering concern, however, is that in the absence of knowing what some potential future guidance and rules might bring, Parties may be very hesitant to pursue bilateral linkages (and try to justify those in the context of their national targets via ITMO transfers).  Only time will tell.

A Sideshow:  The IPCC 1.5o C Report and U.S. Schizophrenia

            There were several sideshows at the climate talks.  One revealed the schizophrenia that has marked U.S. participation in the annual negotiations during the Trump years.  The State Department civil servants who continue to represent the United States in the climate negotiations, again played a helpful role, working constructively with other delegations, and in some cases, even played a (admittedly diminished) leadership role, as in the work on transparency I described above.  But, in addition, the White House again sent a group of political people to make symbolic statements supporting the use of coal and doubting the urgency of action on climate.

This resulted in the bizarre reality of the United States joining Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait to block language that would have endorsed the findings of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report on the Paris Agreement’s aspirational target of limiting warming to a 1.5o C increase this century.  All other countries wanted to include text that would “welcome” the IPCC report, which would indeed have had the effect of endorsing it.  The group of four countries maintained that the report should simply be “noted.”  In what has become classic climate diplomacy, the final language said that the Conference “welcomes the timely completion” of the report, not necessarily its findings.

The Bottom Line

Any sound judgment of the ultimate success or failure of the Katowice climate talks – and more important, the success or failure of the Paris Agreement – will depend upon future climate negotiations and upon the domestic policy actions of the key countries of the world.  For that, it remains too soon to observe or even predict the long-term outcome.

———————————————————–

A Few Additional References:

For a much more succinct assessment of the Katowice climate negotiations, see my column in The Conversation:  “An Economist’s Take on the Poland Climate Conference.”

For a summary of the outcomes of the Katowice meetings, see this report from the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions.

For a detailed summary and assessment of the Katowice outcome, see Axel Michaelowa’s slide deck.

For an assessment that focuses on the process and outcome of the Katowice negotiations with regard to the role of carbon markets, see the COP24 Summary Report of the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA).

For a detailed description of the processes and outcomes on transparency, finance, and stock taking, see Jean Chemnick’s story in ClimateWire.

Share

Harvard Project on Climate Agreements at COP-24

Along with my Harvard colleagues, David Keith, Robert Stowe, and Jason Chapman, I will be at the Twenty-Fourth Conference of the Parties (COP-24) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Katowice, Poland, leading our delegation from the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements (HPCA), December 10-13, 2018.

In addition to holding a series of bilateral meetings with various national delegations, the Harvard Project will participate in (at least) five events.  Two of these are panel sessions organized by HPCA, while the three others are panel sessions organized by national delegations.  My team and I will be at COP-24 in Katowice during the week of December 10, 2018.  COP-24 attendees who wish to meet with the Harvard Project during the conference should send an email Jason Chapman, Project Manager (jason_chapman@hks.harvard.edu).

Five Events in Brief

A Dialogue on Promoting China and US Climate Action
Robert Stavins, Panelist
Hosted by the Counsellors’ Office of the State Council (China) and World Resources Institute
Monday, December 10; 15:30 – 17:00
Location:  China Pavilion

Elaborating and Implementing Article 6 of the Paris Agreement
Hosted by the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements and the Enel Foundation
Tuesday, December 11, 2018;  15:00 – 16:30
Location:  Side Event Room “Wisla”

Governance of Solar Geoengineering Deployment
Hosted by the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
Wednesday, December 12, 2018;  11:00 – 12:30
Location:  Pavilion of the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA)

Enhancing Capacity of Developing Countries to Address Climate Change: Issues and Opportunities
Robert Stavins, Keynote Speaker
Hosted by Korea University, Global Green Growth Institute, and others
Wednesday, December 12, 2018;  15:00 – 18:00
Location:  Korea Pavilion

Sixth Global Climate Change Think Tank Forum: Global Climate Governance and a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind
Robert Stavins, Keynote Speaker
Hosted by the National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation (China)
Wednesday, December 12, 2018;  17:30 – 19:00
Location:  China Pavilion

Two Harvard Project Events in Detail

Elaborating and Implementing Article 6 of the Paris Agreement
Hosted by the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements and the Enel Foundation
Tuesday, December 11, 2018
15:00 – 16:30
Location:  Side Event Room “Wisla”

Participants:

Kelley Kizzier
Co-Chair, Article 6 negotiations
UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice

Michael Mehling
Deputy Director, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Daniele Agostini
Head of Low Carbon and European Energy Policies at Enel
Enel Group

Robert Stavins
A. J. Meyer Professor of Energy and Economic Development, Harvard Kennedy School
Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements

Other participant(s) to be determined

Abstract:

Speakers will consider progress in elaborating Article 6 and what remains to be done, with reference to the potential of Article 6 to enhance ambition. Discussion will be based on practical experience with market mechanisms, academic research, and a close reading of the Paris-Agreement negotiations. The discussion will be based in part on a background paper by Michael Mehling.

Governance of Solar Geoengineering Deployment
Hosted by the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
Wednesday, December 12, 2018
11:00 – 12:30
Location:  Pavilion of the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA)

Participants:

Daniel Bodansky
Regents’ Professor
Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

David Keith
Gordon McKay Professor of Applied Physics, Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences
Faculty Director, Harvard’s Solar Geoengineering Research Program

Robert Stavins
A. J. Meyer Professor of Energy and Economic Development, Harvard Kennedy School
Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements

Other participant(s) to be determined

Abstract:

“Solar geoengineering” (SG) refers to technologies that help reduce radiative forcing and cool the planet. Governing SG deployment poses some unique challenges, in part driven by the incentive structure associated with SG, its risks and uncertainties, and its interaction with mitigation. Panelists will discuss these challenges and the potential role of SG in addressing climate change – relative to mitigation and adaptation. The panel is based in part on a research workshop held at Harvard Kennedy School in September 2018, which I wrote about in my previous entry at this blog.

The Path Ahead

After COP-24, I hope to post an essay at this blog assessing the progress (or lack thereof) made in Katowice.  In the meantime, if you will be at COP-24, and would like to meet with the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, please contact Jason Chapman (jason_chapman@hks.harvard.edu).

Share