About the Author
Robert N. Stavins is the Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government, Director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program, and Chairman of the Environment and Natural Resources Faculty Group.
Tag Archives: free rider problem
On the Origins of Research
In response to my last essay at this web site, “On Becoming an Environmental Economist,” several readers suggested that someday I should write about the origins of my various research initiatives over the past 25 years. Today, I’m doing that … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Corporate Social Responsibility, Economic Policy, Economic Stimulus Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Fisheries Policy, Forest Policy, Health Policy, Natural Resource Economics, Natural Resource Policy, Politics, Positive Political Economy, Water Policy, Wine Economics
Tagged benefit-cost analysis, cap-and-trade, common property resources, cost-effectiveness, distributional analysis, distributional equity, economic valuation, efficiency, environmental politics, externalities, free rider problem, global climate policy, Kyoto Protocol, linkage of cap-and-trade systems, market failure, market-based environmental policies, regulation, revenue-neutral taxes
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On Becoming an Environmental Economist
My essay this month represents a departure from my standard blog posts about a contemporary environmental policy issue. Rather, it is of a more personal nature, and stems from the fact that the second volume of my collected papers has … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Corporate Social Responsibility, Economic Policy, Economic Stimulus Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Fisheries Policy, Forest Policy, Health Policy, Natural Resource Economics, Natural Resource Policy, Politics, Positive Political Economy, Water Policy, Wine Economics
Tagged benefit-cost analysis, cap-and-trade, common property resources, cost-effectiveness, distributional analysis, distributional equity, economic valuation, efficiency, environmental politics, free rider problem, global climate policy, information problems, Kyoto Protocol, linkage of cap-and-trade systems, market failure, market-based environmental policies, public goods, regulation, revenue-neutral taxes
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Economics of the Environment
The Sixth Edition of Economics of the Environment: Selected Readings has just been published by W. W. Norton & Company of New York and London. Through five previous editions, Economics of the Environment has served as a valuable supplement to … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Corporate Social Responsibility, Economic Policy, Economic Stimulus Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Fisheries Policy, Forest Policy, Natural Resource Economics, Natural Resource Policy, Politics, Positive Political Economy, Water Policy
Tagged Australia, benefit-cost analysis, Brazil, California, cap-and-trade, China, common property resources, cost-effectiveness, distributional analysis, distributional equity, economic valuation, efficiency, environmental politics, European Union, externalities, free rider problem, global climate policy, import allowance requirement, India, information problems, Japan, Korea, Kyoto Protocol, linkage of cap-and-trade systems, market failure, market-based environmental policies, Mexico, Obama Administration, Office of Management and Budget, public goods, regulation, revenue-neutral taxes, sulfur dioxide
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The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon
Friday, October 21st was a significant day for climate change policy worldwide and for the use of market-based approaches to environmental protection, but it went largely unnoticed across the country and around the world, outside, that is, of the State … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Economic Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Politics, Positive Political Economy
Tagged AB 32, Alberta, Australia, British Columbia, California, California Air Resources Board, cap-and-trade, carbon taxes, Clean Development, Clean Development Mechanism, Clean Energy Standards, collateral damage, common property resources, cost-effectiveness, distributional equity, efficiency, emission reduction credits, environmental politics, EU ETS, European Union, externalities, fossil fuel subsidies, free rider problem, global climate policy, harmonized carbon taxes, Harvard Kennedy School, international carbon tax, international tradable permits, Japan, Joseph Aldy, Journal of Environment and Development, Kyoto Protocol, leaded gasoline, linkage, linkage of cap-and-trade systems, Maria Damon, market failure, market-based environmental policies, New York Review of Books, New Zealand, North American Climate Initiative, Obama Administration, offsets, Ontario, political polarization, public goods, Quebec, regulation, Resources for the Future, revenue-neutral taxes, sulfur dioxide, tarnishing of cap-and-trade, Thomas Sterner, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, Waxman-Markey legislation, William Nordhaus
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Canada’s Step Away From the Kyoto Protocol Can Be a Constructive Step Forward
Canada confirmed this week that it will not take on a target under an extension of the Kyoto Protocol following the completion of the first commitment period, 2008-2012. Given that Canada is likely to miss by a wide margin its … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Annex I, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Cancun, China, COP-15, COP-16, COP-17, Copenhagen Accord, distributional equity, Durban, environmental politics, European Union, free rider problem, global climate policy, India, Japan, Korea, Kyoto Protocol, Mexico, New Zealand, Obama Administration, Russia, South Africa
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Reflecting on a Century of Progress and Problems
As the first decade of the twenty-first century comes to a close, the problem of the commons is more important to our lives – and more central to economics – than a century ago when the first issue of the … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Fisheries Policy, Natural Resource Economics, Natural Resource Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged A. C. Pigou, American Economic Review, benefit-cost analysis, cap-and-trade, China, common property resources, cost-effectiveness, distributional analysis, distributional equity, economic valuation, efficiency, Elinor Ostrom, environmental politics, excludable, externalities, fisheries, free rider problem, Garrett Hardin, global climate policy, India, Indiana University, Katharine Coman, market failure, market-based environmental policies, non-excludable, non-renewable natural resource, open-access resource, private property, public goods, regulation, renewable natural resource, revenue-neutral taxes, rivalness, Ronald Coase, sulfur dioxide, Wellesley College
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What Happened (and Why): An Assessment of the Cancun Agreements
The international climate negotiations in Cancun, Mexico, have concluded, and despite the gloom-and-doom predictions that dominated the weeks and months leading up to Cancun, the Sixteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-16) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Forest Policy, Natural Resource Policy
Tagged ALBA States, Australia, AWG-KP, AWG-LCA, Bolivia, Brazil, Cancun, CDM, China, Christiana Figueres, Climate Technology Center and Network, COP-15, COP-16, COP-17, Copenhagen, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, Council on Foreign Relations, Cuba, D, Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen, distributional equity, Durban, environmental politics, European Union, free rider problem, G20, global climate policy, Green Climate Fund, India, Japan, Korea, Major Economies Forum, market-based environmental policies, Mexico, Michael Levi, Nicaragua, Obama Administration, Patricia Espinosa, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, REDD+, South Africa, Sudan, Turkey, Venezuela
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Defining Success for Climate Negotiations in Cancun
International climate negotiations will continue in Cancun, Mexico, during the first two weeks of December, 2010. These will be the Sixteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-16) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The key challenge is … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Natural Resource Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Australia, Brazil, Cancun, China, COP-15, COP-16, Copenhagen, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, distributional equity, efficiency, environmental politics, European Union, free rider problem, George W. Bush, global climate policy, India, Japan, Korea, linkage of cap-and-trade systems, Major Economies Forum, market failure, market-based environmental policies, Mexico, New Zealand, Obama Administration, South Africa, Waxman-Markey legislation
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Both Are Necessary, But Neither is Sufficient: Carbon-Pricing and Technology R&D Initiatives in a Meaningful National Climate Policy
For many years, there has been a great deal of discussion about carbon-pricing – whether carbon taxes or cap-and-trade – as an essential part of a meaningful national climate policy. It has long been recognized that although carbon-pricing will be … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Economic Stimulus Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Natural Resource Economics, Natural Resource Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged ARPA-E, cap-and-trade, carbon pricing, carbon tax, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, David Leonhardt, efficiency, environmental politics, externalities, free rider problem, global climate policy, green jobs, information problems, market failure, market-based environmental policies, New York Times, Obama Administration, patents, public goods, R&D, regulation, revenue-neutral taxes, Robert Hahn, technological change, technology innovation, technology R&D policies, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, Wall Street Journal, Waxman-Markey legislation
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AB 32, RGGI, and Climate Change: The National Context of State Policies for a Global Commons Problem
Why should anyone be interested in the national context of a state policy? In the case of California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32), the answer flows directly from the very nature of the problem — global climate change, the … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Natural Resource Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged AB 32, Best Available Control Technology, CAFE standards, cap-and-trade, carbon tax, carbon-pricing policy, cost-effectiveness, Dormant Commerce Clause, endangerment finding, environmental politics, free rider problem, global climate policy, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Lawrence Goulder, linkage of cap-and-trade systems, market failure, market-based environmental policies, Massachusetts v EPA, mobile source standards, National Bureau of Economic Research, new source performance standards, New Source Review, NIMBY, Obama Administration, Pavley standards, price collar, principal-agent problem, public goods, public nuisance, regulation, revenue-neutral taxes, RGGI, safety-valve, Stanford University, sulfur dioxide, Supreme Court, tailoring rule, technological change, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, Waxman-Markey legislation, Western Climate Initiative
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Eyes on the Prize: Federal Climate Policy Should Preempt State and Regional Initiatives
In just a few days, Senators John Kerry, Lindsey Graham, and Joe Lieberman will release their much-anticipated proposal for comprehensive climate and energy legislation – the best remaining shot at forging a bipartisan consensus on this issue in 2010. Their … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Assembly Bill 32, building codes, California, cap-and-trade, carbon dioxide, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, environmental politics, free rider problem, global climate policy, greenhouse gases, information problems, market failure, market-based environmental policies, Massachusetts, Obama Administration, preemption, principal-agent problem, regulation, RGGI, Senator Graham, Senator Kerry, Senator Lieberman, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, Waxman-Markey legislation, zoning
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What’s the Proper Role of Individuals and Institutions in Addressing Climate Change?
This may seem like a trivial question with an obvious answer. But what really is the proper role for individuals and institutions in addressing climate change? An immediate and natural response may be that everyone should do their part. Let’s … Continue reading
Unintended Consequences of Government Policies: The Depletion of America’s Wetlands
Private land-use decisions can be affected dramatically by public investments in highways, waterways, flood control, or other infrastructure. The large movement of jobs from central cities to suburbs in the postwar United States and the ongoing destruction of Amazon rain … Continue reading
Posted in Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Forest Policy, Natural Resource Economics, Natural Resource Policy, Water Policy
Tagged benefit-cost analysis, Clean Water Act, common property resources, econometric analysis, economic valuation, environmental politics, externalities, free rider problem, infrastructure, land use, market failure, public goods, regulation, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Soil Conservation Service, wetlands
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Another Copenhagen Outcome: Serious Questions About the Best Institutional Path Forward
Whether you like it or not, for the time being the most important product of the December meeting in Copenhagen of the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-15) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Australia, Brazil, China, COP-15, Copenhagen, Copenhagen Accord, distributional equity, environmental politics, European Union, free rider problem, g-20, g-77, global climate policy, India, institutions, Japan, Korea, Major Economies Forum, Mexico, Obama Administration, South Africa, UNFCCC
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What Hath Copenhagen Wrought? A Preliminary Assessment of the Copenhagen Accord
After years of preparation, the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-15) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) commenced on December 7th, 2009, and adjourned some two weeks later on December 19th after a raucous all-night session. … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Forest Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Annex I, Asia-Pacific Economic Conference, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Brazilian President da Silva, cap-and-trade, China, common but differentiated responsibilities, Copenhagen, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, Cuba, distributional equity, environmental politics, European Union, finance, forestry, free rider problem, global climate policy, import allowance requirement, India, Indian Prime Minister Singh, Japan, Korea, Major Economies Forum, market-based environmental policies, Mexico, Nicaragua, Obama Administration, Portfolio Approach, Premier Wen Jiabo, South Africa, South African President Zuma, Sudan, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, UNFCCC, Venezuela, Waxman-Markey legislation
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Chaos and Uncertainty in Copenhagen?
Earlier today, I was asked by the Financial Times, “who is responsible for the chaos and uncertainty” at COP-15 in Copenhagen? I’m not sure those are the words I would have chosen to characterize the situation at the climate negotiations … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Natural Resource Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Australia, Bella Center, Brazil, Civil Society, common property resources, Copenhagen, cost-effectiveness, Denmark, distributional equity, efficiency, environmental politics, European Union, Financial Times, free rider problem, global climate policy, India, Japan, market failure, market-based environmental policies, Mexico, New Zealand, Obama Administration, public goods, South Africa, United Nations
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Three Pillars of a New Climate Pact
THE climate change summit at the United Nations on Tuesday, September 22nd, is aimed to build momentum for the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen in December, where nations will continue … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy
Tagged Australia, Canada, cap-and-trade, carbon leakage, China, climate agreements, COP-15, cost-effectiveness, distributional equity, European Union, externalities, free rider problem, G20, global climate policy, growth targets, international climate policy architecture, Japan, Kyoto Protocol, linkage of cap-and-trade systems, market-based environmental policies, New Zealand, Obama Administration, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, United Nations, Waxman-Markey legislation
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Too Good to be True?
Global climate change is a serious environmental threat, and sound public policies are needed to address it effectively and sensibly. There is now significant interest and activity within both the U.S. Administration and the U.S. Congress to develop a meaningful … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy
Tagged AB 32, benefit-cost analysis, California, cap-and-trade, common property resources, cost-effectiveness, energy efficiency, environmental politics, externalities, free rider problem, global climate policy, market-based environmental policies, regulation, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, Waxman-Markey legislation
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Worried About International Competitiveness? Another Look at the Waxman-Markey Cap-and-Trade Proposal
The potential impacts of proposed U.S. climate policies on the competitiveness of U.S. industries is a major political issue, and it was one of the key issues in the Energy and Commerce Committee of the House of Representatives in the … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy
Tagged aluminum, Australia, Brazil, cap-and-trade, cement, China, comparative advantage, developing countries, efficiency, environmental politics, European Union, fossil fuels, free rider problem, glass, global climate policy, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, import allowance requirement, India, Indonesia, international climate agreement, international copetitiveness, International Reserve Allowance Program, iron, Japan, leakage, Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, linkage of cap-and-trade systems, market-based environmental policies, Mexico, New Zealand, Obama Administration, output-based updating allocation, paper, revenue-neutral taxes, South Africa, steel, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, Waxman-Markey legislation, World Trade Organization (WTO)
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Straight Talk about Corporate Social Responsibility
Critical thinking about “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) is needed, because there are few topics where discussions feature greater ratios of heat to light. With this in mind, two of my Harvard colleagues – law professor Bruce Hay and business school … Continue reading
The Myth of the Universal Market
Communication among economists, other social scientists, natural scientists, and lawyers is far from perfect. When the topic is the environment, discourse across disciplines is both important and difficult. Economists themselves have likely contributed to some misunderstandings about how they think … Continue reading