The Future of U.S. Carbon-Pricing Policy

In 2007, I was asked by the leaders of the Brookings Institution’s Hamilton Project to write a paper describing a national emissions trading system to reduce U.S. carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions to help address the threat of global climate change.  I responded that I would prefer to write broadly about carbon-pricing instruments, including what I considered to be the symmetric instruments of a carbon tax and a carbon trading program.  But the Hamilton Project leaders said no, they would find someone else to write about carbon taxes (which turned out to be Gib Metcalf), and they wanted me to “make the strongest case possible for” what is today called a cap-and-trade system.  I did my best, and in the process I came to be identified – and to some degree may have become – an advocate for CO2 cap-and-trade.  For better or for worse, during the Obama administration transition, the design recommendations in my Hamilton Project paper became one of the starting points for efforts to structure the administration’s proposed CO2 cap-and-trade system that became part of the failed Waxman-Markey legislation, H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009.

More than a decade later, I have written a new paper in which I seek to approach this question as I wished to in the first place, treating both instruments in a balanced manner, examining their merits and challenges, without necessarily favoring one or the other.  On May 16, 2019, I presented this new paper at the National Bureau of Economic Research’s first annual Environmental and Energy Policy and the Economy Conference, held at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.  My topic was, “The Future of U.S. Carbon-Pricing Policy.”  (It will be forthcoming in Environmental and Energy Policy and the Economy, volume 1, edited by Matthew Kotchen, James Stock, and Catherine Wolfram, published by the University of Chicago Press.)  In today’s blog essay, I provide a very brief summary of the paper, based upon the presentation I made at the NBER conference.  I hope you will find this of sufficient interest to download and read the complete paper.

Premises, Questions, and Conclusions

I began this research with two major premises:  first, that economists and most other policy analysts agree that carbon-pricing will likely be a necessary (although not sufficient) part of any meaningful, long term U.S. climate change policy, because of:  (1) feasibility – the necessity of affecting millions, indeed hundreds of millions, of decentralized decisions; (2) cost-effectiveness, given the tremendous heterogeneity of marginal abatement costs; and (3) the importance of providing incentives for carbon-friendly technological change.  My second premise was that there is much less agreement among economists (and other policy analysts) regarding the choice of specific carbon-pricing policy instrument – carbon tax or cap-and-trade.

This prompts two questions:  (1) how do the two major approaches to carbon pricing compare on relevant dimensions, including but not limited to efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and distributional equity?  (2) Which approach is more likely to be adopted in the future in the United States?

Having carried out an exhaustive examination, two major conclusions stand out (among others).  First, that the specific designs of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade are more consequential than the choice between the two instruments.  And second, that political feasibility affects the normative merits of the two instruments, and vice versa.

Similarities & Symmetries

Of fourteen separate issues I examine, some appear at first to be key differences (in theory), but many of these differences fade on closer inspection, and depend on specifics of design.

First of all, carbon taxes and commensurate cap-and-trade turn out to be perfectly equivalent in regard to:   (a) incentives for emission reduction (both can be upstream on the carbon content of fossil fuels); (b) aggregate abatement costs (both can be cost-effective, both provide the same incentives for technological change, and both can utilize offsets to further lower aggregate abatement costs); and (c) effects on competitiveness (both can lessen these impacts via appropriate border adjustment mechanisms).

Next, the two instruments are nearly equivalent in regard to possibilities for raising revenue (cap-and-trade can utilize auctions, but given the structure of Congressional committees, revenue recycling may be easier with taxes).

And these instruments are similar in regard to:  (a) costs to regulated firms (cap-and-trade systems can freely allocate allowances, and taxes can provide inframarginal exemptions below a specified level of emissions); and (b) distributional impacts (the two instruments can be designed to be roughly equivalent in this regard).

Differences & Distinctions

Beginning with the least significant differences, there are relatively minor distinctions in terms of transaction costs (decreasing marginal transaction costs in cap-and-trade systems – such as with volume discounts on brokers’ fees – can violate the independence property, whereby the equilibrium allocation of allowances and hence aggregate costs are ordinarily independent of the initial allocation).

There are more meaningful, but still subtle differences with regard to:  (a) performance in the presence of uncertainty (for this, I urge you to read at least this section of the complete paper, because new research suggests that the implications of the classic Weitzman rule in the presence of a stock externality are moderated – if not reversed – due to the persistent effects of technology shocks, which foster positive correlation between marginal benefits and marginal costs); and (b) linkage with other jurisdictions (it is easier with cap-and-trade systems, but tax systems can also be linked).

That said, there are significant differences between the instruments in terms of:  (a) carbon-price volatility (a problem only with cap-and-trade systems, but a problem that can be mitigated with price collars and banking of allowances); (b) interactions with complementary policies (a significant issue with cap-and-trade systems, which is much less severe with carbon taxes, because the “waterbed effect” is eliminated); (c) market manipulation (there is a need for regulatory oversight in cap-and-trade systems, but tax evasion is a parallel issue in tax systems, although presumably less severe in the U.S. context); and (d) complexity and administrative requirements (cap-and-trade is certainly more complex and has greater administrative requirements, but one might ask whether a simple tax will remain “simple” as it works its way through the Congress).

Hybrid Policy Instruments and a Policy Continuum

Many of the remaining differences can diminish further with implementation.  Indeed, hybrid policies which mix features of tax and cap-and-trade blur distinctions.  For example, auctioning of allowances and the use of price collars bring cap-and-trade closer to a tax system; and quantity formula employed to adjust a tax, and the use of tax revenues to mitigate emissions bring a tax closer to cap-and-trade.  The result is that the dichotomous choice between a carbon tax and cap-and-trade can become a choice of design elements along a policy continuum, and the design of these instruments can be more consequential than the choice between the two.

Which is More Likely to be Adopted – Taxes or Trading?  Positive Political Theory

Framing this question in terms of the metaphor of a political market, it is helpful to think about political demand and political supply of policy instruments.  In terms of the demand from interest groups, first, regulated industry may oppose an ordinary tax approach, as it typically leads to greater costs than the simplest cap-and-trade (or than a performance standard, for that matter), because private industry is paying not only for compliance costs, but also for the tax on residual emissions.  Second, regulated industry may favor cap-and-trade, because it conveys scarcity rents to firms, and can provide entry barriers for potential new entrants, which can make the rents sustainable.

Environmental advocacy groups favor cap-and-trade, due to the emissions certainty it provides, but also because presumably they have a preference for policies that help obscure costs, and cap-and-trade does a better job of sweeping discussion of costs under the rug than does a tax.  However, in the era since cap-and-trade was demonized as “cap-and-tax,” this difference may be much less than it was!

Turning to the supply side (within the legislature), the revenue from either a tax or auctioning of allowances can be attractive to government.  And because of the independence property of cap-and-trade, legislators can allocate allowances to build political support without increasing the costs or reducing the effectiveness of the policy.  Of course, this important political advantage becomes an economic disadvantage if it invites particularly harmful rent-seeking behavior.  Finally, environmental policy makers tend to think in terms of pollution quantities, not prices.

Experience with Carbon Pricing:  Emissions Coverage & Price in Implemented Initiatives

            There are some fifty carbon-pricing systems in operation worldwide, with equal numbers of carbon taxes and carbon cap-and-trade systems.  A quick comparison of these policies reveals two striking realities.  First, the highest carbon prices (the height of the bars in the figure below) are for carbon taxes (in norther Europe).  Second, the scope of coverage (the width of each bar in the figure) of cap-and-trade systems greatly exceeds that of carbon taxes.  Putting the two features (severity and scope) together, a reasonable measure of the relative importance of the policies is given by multiplying the carbon price (tax level or market price of allowances) by the tons of coverage, that is, the respective areas in the figure.  On this basis, it appears that political revealed preference has been weighted toward cap-and-trade (at least up until now).

Carbon Price & Emissions Coverage of Implemented Carbon-Pricing Initiatives

Which Has Worked Better – Experiences with Trading and Taxes

Based upon more than thirty years of experience with cap-and-trade systems, including but not limited to CO2 programs, lessons regarding the design and efficacy of these systems can be drawn.  In brief, there is empirical evidence for the following:  cap-and-trade has proven to be environmentally effective and economically cost-effective; downstream, sectoral programs have been common, but economy-wide upstream systems are feasible; transaction costs have been low to trivial; a robust market requires a cap below business-as-usual; banking has been exceptionally important, representing a large share of the gains from trade; price collars are very beneficial; free allocation of allowances fosters political support, with a likely transition to greater auctioning over time; competitiveness impacts can be mitigated with an output-based updating allocation; “complementary policies” are common, but in some cases can have perverse consequences, including no additional emissions reduction, an increase in aggregate costs, and suppressed allowance prices.

Turning to experiences with carbon taxes, two applications stand out.  First, there are the northern European carbon tax systems, initiated in the 1990s in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland.  Typically these were elements of broader energy and excise tax reform initiatives, and some are at the highest levels of any carbon-pricing regimes worldwide.  However, fiscal cushioning has been common for industries expressing concerns.  That said, these taxes have raised significant revenues to finance spending or to lower other tax rates, but unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence of their emissions impacts.

More striking is British Columbia’s carbon tax, initiated in 2008, which comes closest to that recommended by economists.  Currently, it is an upstream tax of $27/ton of CO2, but with important exemptions in place for key industries.  Importantly, 100% of tax revenue was originally refunded through general tax rate cuts, but over time, there has been more focus on tax cuts for specific sectors and locations.  Although there is some debate in the literature, it appears to have been effective in reducing emissions.

Empirical Evidence for Positive Assessment

Given that the normative differences between the two instruments are minimal, a key question becomes which instrument is more politically feasible, and which is more likely — in practice — to be well designed.  Based on experiences with cap-and-trade and carbon taxes, the relative masses in the figure above suggest that political revealed preference has favored the former.  Furthermore, after years of deliberation, China has chosen trading for its national program (although it appears to be a set of sectoral tradable performance standards, not a true, mass-based cap-and-trade system).  In addition, the new “Transportation and Climate Initiative” in the northeast United States was first proposed in terms of fuel taxes but is gravitating toward cap-and-trade.  Also, New Jersey is preparing to rejoin the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and Oregon is poised to enact an economy-wide CO2 cap-and-trade system this year.  On the other hand, Washington State has twice defeated a carbon tax.

But past may not be prologue.  The demonization of the Waxman-Markey trading system as “cap-and-tax” may have reduced the political advantage of cap-and-trade (that it can hide the costs).  And there is clearly increasing interest in a national carbon tax in the policy world, including several bills in Congress and the prominent Climate Leadership Council proposal.  On the other hand, the “Green New Deal” is silent about carbon-pricing of any kind.

It is worthwhile focusing on the political economy of the British Columbia carbon tax.  Its successful enactment has been attributed to “the confluence of political conditions ripe for carbon taxation”:  untapped hydroelectric potential; a strongly environmentalist electorate (as in the case of California’s move to cap-and-trade with Assembly Bill 32); a right-center government with trust from the business community (as with the George H.W. Bush administration’s SO2 allowance trading system in the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990); and a premier with institutional capacity to pursue personal policy preferences.  There has been increasing public support over time, due to the perception of emissions reductions without severe economic impacts, but political pressures have caused the evolution of the system from using revenues exclusively to cut distortionary taxes to greater use of tax cuts to favor specific sectors and regions.

Clearly, political pressures can drive up social costs with either type of carbon-pricing instrument.  On the one hand, politics may disfavor the auctioning of allowances in cap-and-trade systems, while, on the other hand, politics may disfavor cost-effective cuts of distortionary taxes in tax systems.

Does Either Carbon-Pricing Instrument Dominate in Normative or Positive Terms?

When carbon taxes and cap-and-trade are designed to be truly comparable, their characteristics and outcomes are similar, and in some cases fully equivalent (normatively), in terms of their:  emission reductions, abatement costs, revenue raising, costs to regulated firms, distributional impacts, and competitiveness effects.  But on some other dimensions, there can be real differences in performance.  The tax approach is favored by administrative requirements, interactions with complementary policies, and effects on carbon-price volatility; whereas cap-and-trade is favored by linkage with policies in other jurisdictions, and possibly by anticipated performance in the presence of uncertainty.  In the positive political economy domain, the evidence is also decidedly mixed.  Hence, there is not a strong case for the blanket superiority of either instrument.  Differences in design simply dominate differences between the instruments themselves.

Can Carbon-Pricing be Made More Politically Acceptable?

The track record of 50 carbon-pricing policies cited above should be contrasted with the 176 countries with renewable energy policies or energy efficiency standards, as well as another 110 national and sub-national jurisdictions with feed-in tariffs.  Hence, carbon pricing has not in general been the favored approach to climate change policy.  Why is this the case?  Survey and other evidence indicates that public perceptions – some of which are inaccurate – are primary factors behind aversion to carbon taxes:  “personal costs too great; policy is regressive; could damage economy; will not discourage carbon-intensive behavior; and government just want the revenues.”  So, one way to improve public acceptance could be through better information, that is, education.

But another way forward could be through judicious policy design, which may well depart from first-best design, including:  phasing in taxes/caps over time (which was effective in California and British Columbia); earmarking revenues from taxes/auctions to finance additional climate mitigation, in contrast with optimizing the system via cuts in distortionary taxes; and/or using revenues for fairness purposes, such as with lump-sum rebates or rebates targeted to low-income and other particularly burdened constituencies (a carbon tax with “carbon dividends” or a cap-and-trade system in the form of “cap-and-dividend”).

Has the Defeat of National CO2 Cap-and-Trade Initiatives Provided Openings for Carbon Tax Proposals?

Political polarization has decimated the key source of Congressional support for environmental/energy action, the political middle.  And the successful political battle against the Obama administration’s CO2 cap-and-trade legislation featured the effective demonization of that instrument as “cap-and-tax.”  Does the consequent reputational loss for cap-and-trade provide a meaningful opening for the other carbon-pricing instrument – a carbon tax?

It would seem that large budgetary deficits ought to increase the attraction of new sources of revenue, but existing carbon tax proposals have largely been revenue-neutral.  That said, it is surely true that there has been increased attention to carbon taxes from the “policy community,” with support coming not just from Democrats, but also from prominent Republican academic economists and former Republican high government officials.  But – finally – what about in the real political world of those currently holding elective office in the federal government?

It is presumably good news for carbon tax proposals that they are not “cap-and-trade.”  Perhaps that helps with the political messaging.  But if conservative opposition could tarnish cap-and-trade as “cap-and-tax,” surely it will not be difficult to label a tax as a tax!  And in addition to such opposition from the political right, it is – as of now – questionable whether the new left will want a carbon tax to be part of its “Green New Deal.”

Hence, in the short term, national carbon pricing of either type will likely continue to face an uphill battle.  Therefore, in addition to considering second-best carbon-pricing design (as I recommended above), economists can work productively to catch up with political realities by considering better designs of second-best non-pricing instruments, such as clean energy standards.

But, at some point the politics will change, and it is important to be ready, which is why – for the longer term – ongoing research on carbon-pricing is very much warranted, particularly if it can be carried out in the context of real-world politics, and focus on policies that are likely at some point to prove feasible.

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Climate Negotiations in Poland Advanced Implementation of the Paris Agreement

During two weeks of sometimes boisterous plenary sessions and equally energetic backroom discussions, the 197 Parties of the Twenty-Fourth Conference of the Parties (COP-24) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), meeting in Katowice, Poland, sought to reach consensus on rules and guidelines for implementing the Paris Agreement.  That landmark 2015 accord came into force in 2016, and is scheduled to begin operations in earnest in 2020.  The fault lines at the Katowice negotiations were, as usual, largely between two groups:  the 43 industrialized countries, and the 154 developing nations.

Hanging over the negotiations was the reality that U.S. President Donald Trump announced in June 2017 that the United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement (in November, 2020, the soonest that any Party can actually withdraw).  Since Trump’s announcement, the former co-leadership by the United States and China, which had been critical to the passage of the Paris Agreement, has evolved into something between sole leadership by China and co-leadership by China and the European Union.

Not long before midnight on Saturday, December 15th, a full 24 hours after COP-24 was scheduled to conclude, consensus was reached on the 156-page Rulebook, with considerable credit due to the Polish presidency of the Conference (not to be confused with the presidency of the Polish nation), in the person of Michał Kurtyka, Poland’s Deputy Minister of Energy. As Jean Chemnick wrote in E&E News, the Rulebook represents a transition from an “idealized expression of world solidarity” in the Paris Agreement to a “set of mechanisms that countries hope will deliver results.”

But was COP-24 Really a Success?

A simple “yes” or “no” response to this question would be misleading.  There were literally dozens of aspects of the Paris Agreement on which the delegates to the Katowice meetings wanted to make progress by filling in details in the 29 articles of the skeletal Paris Agreement.  In my mind, two areas stood out.  One is referred to as “transparency,” and other is characterized (somewhat inaccurately) as “markets.”  Combining the achievements and lack thereof on both fronts, I assess the outcome of the Katowice talks to be more than a half-full glass of water (or wine, if you prefer).

First of Two Key Issues:  Transparency

Transparency refers to the credibility of each nation’s measurement of its own performance – in terms of its emissions and its policies.  The Paris Agreement gave significant wiggle room to the vast majority of countries – the 154 developing countries – by granting them flexibility in meeting the transparency requirements (which were to be established for the industrialized countries).  The U.S. delegation – consisting of civil servants led by long-time State Department official Trigg Talley – again worked closely with the Chinese delegation to foster a remarkable consensus that all countries must follow uniform standards for measuring emissions and tracking the achievement of their respect targets (Nationally Determined Contributions or NDCs).  This was a significant achievement, and a major step forward toward a level playing field among the countries of the world.

Conceivably, it could make it easier for the Trump administration to remain in the Paris Agreement (if the President were to become convinced that such action would be politically advantageous in the run-up to the November 2020 U.S. presidential election).  And, likewise, it will make it easier for a future (Democratic or Republican) administration to rejoin the Paris Agreement if the current President follows through on his promise to withdraw.  That is a significant success.

Second of Two Key Issues:  Article 6.2 and Carbon Markets

Turning to the second key set of issues at COP-24, I have frequently written that there are two necessary conditions for ultimate success of the Paris Agreement:  adequate scope of participation, and adequate ambition of the individual national contributions.  The first condition has surely been met, with 97% of global emissions associated with countries taking on responsibilities under Paris, compared with 14% under the current commitment period of the predecessor international agreement, the Kyoto Protocol of 1997.  But the factor that brought about such broad participation – namely, that each country’s target is anchored in its own national circumstances and colored by its domestic political reality – suggests that the individual contributions will not be collectively sufficient (due to the global commons nature of the problem).

Because of this, a key question has been whether there are ways that the Paris Agreement itself, as it is fleshed out, can enable and indeed facilitate increased ambition over time?  One answer, on which I have carried out extensive research with colleagues, can be provided by the linkage of regional, national, and sub-national policies – connections among policy systems that allow emission reduction efforts to be redistributed across systems.

Heterogeneous Linkage

Linkage is typically framed as between cap-and-trade systems, but regional, national, and sub-national policies will be highly heterogeneous, including a variety of types of emissions trading systems, carbon taxes, and conventional performance and technology standards.  As my research in this area with Michael Mehling (M.I.T.) and Gilbert Metcalf (Tufts University) has found, linkage among such heterogeneous policies is not trivial, but is – in many cases – feasible.

This is important because linkage fosters: cost savings by allowing firms to take advantage of lower cost abatement opportunities in other jurisdictions; improved functioning of markets by reducing market power and price volatility; political benefits to linking parties; administrative economies of scale; and – perhaps most important – the possibility of satisfying the UNFCCC’s key criterion of distributional equity – “common but differentiated responsibilities” – without sacrificing cost-effectiveness.

Fortunately, such linkage can be consistent with the Paris Agreement, under the authority of its Article 6, focused on international cooperation.  In particular, Article 6.2 provides for cooperative approaches among Parties, with Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) potentially serving as an accounting mechanism to ensure that international linkages do not result in double-counting or other errors when comparing each country’s emissions to its stated target.

So, What Happened in Katowice?

In Katowice, the delegates sought to write guidelines for Article 6 that could make its promise a reality.  Negotiators had an opportunity to define clear and consistent guidance for the accounting of emissions transfers under Article 6.2.  My view in advance of the Katowice talks was that a robust accounting framework for ITMO transfers could foster better linkage of climate policies across jurisdictions, but that if the guidance extended much beyond basic accounting rules, restrictive requirements could actually impede effective linkage, and be counter-productive.

In precisely this regard, two potential impediments arose in Katowice.  Proposals were introduced to place an explicit tax on ITMO transfers under the rubric of “Share of Proceeds,” meaning a payment by the transferring parties to a fund intended to help vulnerable developing countries meet their costs of adaptation to climate change.  Whereas the objective of financing adaptation has great merit, it is well covered and belongs in other parts of the Paris Agreement, not as a tax on trading.

The other potential impediment was in the form of proposals for an implicit tax on transfers, known as “Overall Mitigation in Global Emissions,” meaning that each transfer must result in a net reduction in overall emissions.  Again, increasing ambition over time is important, but that is dealt with appropriately in other parts of the Agreement, not by making it an implicit tax on market activity.

Last-Minute Maneuvers

As the end of the second week of negotiations approached, it appeared that both of these potential impediments might be finessed, if not completely avoided.  But then a single country – Brazil – decided to hold up the talks all night on the final Friday by insisting that it would not let there be any progress on rules for Article 6.2 unless the Conference agreed to state – under Article 6.4, viewed by most as an extension of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) – that it could use its large surplus of CDM credits (of questionable credibility) to help meet its Paris commitments in a manner that would have resulted in double-counting.  The Brazilian delegation refused to budge, and the result was that Article 6 was not included in the Katowice decision.  Rather, it was punted to COP-25, to be held next year in Santiago, Chile.

So, the outcome with this second issue was clearly not a great success, but was it a complete failure, or was it something in between?  This gets quite interesting.  On first blush, a lack of agreement on the rules of the road for Article 6.2 would seem to render ITMO transfers impossible – and hence reduce the scope for bilateral international linkages.

Does the Cloud Have a Silver Lining?

As Nathaniel Keohane (Environmental Defense Fund) has pointed out, countries can move ahead with international transfers even without guidance under Article 6.2, because that article is explicit that countries may use transferred mitigation outcomes toward meeting their national targets whether or not additional rules have been written.  The crucial phrase is that any transfer must be “consistent with guidance,” meaning that if guidance exists, it must be followed, but meaningful action does not depend on the existence of guidance.  Keohane indicates that this language was intentionally written into the Paris Agreement precisely because the United States and others feared that Brazil would try to hold Article 6.2 hostage to Article 6.4 — exactly as they did in Katowice.

I hope very much that Dr. Keohane’s interpretation is correct.  My lingering concern, however, is that in the absence of knowing what some potential future guidance and rules might bring, Parties may be very hesitant to pursue bilateral linkages (and try to justify those in the context of their national targets via ITMO transfers).  Only time will tell.

A Sideshow:  The IPCC 1.5o C Report and U.S. Schizophrenia

            There were several sideshows at the climate talks.  One revealed the schizophrenia that has marked U.S. participation in the annual negotiations during the Trump years.  The State Department civil servants who continue to represent the United States in the climate negotiations, again played a helpful role, working constructively with other delegations, and in some cases, even played a (admittedly diminished) leadership role, as in the work on transparency I described above.  But, in addition, the White House again sent a group of political people to make symbolic statements supporting the use of coal and doubting the urgency of action on climate.

This resulted in the bizarre reality of the United States joining Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait to block language that would have endorsed the findings of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report on the Paris Agreement’s aspirational target of limiting warming to a 1.5o C increase this century.  All other countries wanted to include text that would “welcome” the IPCC report, which would indeed have had the effect of endorsing it.  The group of four countries maintained that the report should simply be “noted.”  In what has become classic climate diplomacy, the final language said that the Conference “welcomes the timely completion” of the report, not necessarily its findings.

The Bottom Line

Any sound judgment of the ultimate success or failure of the Katowice climate talks – and more important, the success or failure of the Paris Agreement – will depend upon future climate negotiations and upon the domestic policy actions of the key countries of the world.  For that, it remains too soon to observe or even predict the long-term outcome.

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A Few Additional References:

For a much more succinct assessment of the Katowice climate negotiations, see my column in The Conversation:  “An Economist’s Take on the Poland Climate Conference.”

For a summary of the outcomes of the Katowice meetings, see this report from the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions.

For a detailed summary and assessment of the Katowice outcome, see Axel Michaelowa’s slide deck.

For an assessment that focuses on the process and outcome of the Katowice negotiations with regard to the role of carbon markets, see the COP24 Summary Report of the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA).

For a detailed description of the processes and outcomes on transparency, finance, and stock taking, see Jean Chemnick’s story in ClimateWire.

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Harvard Project on Climate Agreements at COP-24

Along with my Harvard colleagues, David Keith, Robert Stowe, and Jason Chapman, I will be at the Twenty-Fourth Conference of the Parties (COP-24) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Katowice, Poland, leading our delegation from the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements (HPCA), December 10-13, 2018.

In addition to holding a series of bilateral meetings with various national delegations, the Harvard Project will participate in (at least) five events.  Two of these are panel sessions organized by HPCA, while the three others are panel sessions organized by national delegations.  My team and I will be at COP-24 in Katowice during the week of December 10, 2018.  COP-24 attendees who wish to meet with the Harvard Project during the conference should send an email Jason Chapman, Project Manager (jason_chapman@hks.harvard.edu).

Five Events in Brief

A Dialogue on Promoting China and US Climate Action
Robert Stavins, Panelist
Hosted by the Counsellors’ Office of the State Council (China) and World Resources Institute
Monday, December 10; 15:30 – 17:00
Location:  China Pavilion

Elaborating and Implementing Article 6 of the Paris Agreement
Hosted by the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements and the Enel Foundation
Tuesday, December 11, 2018;  15:00 – 16:30
Location:  Side Event Room “Wisla”

Governance of Solar Geoengineering Deployment
Hosted by the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
Wednesday, December 12, 2018;  11:00 – 12:30
Location:  Pavilion of the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA)

Enhancing Capacity of Developing Countries to Address Climate Change: Issues and Opportunities
Robert Stavins, Keynote Speaker
Hosted by Korea University, Global Green Growth Institute, and others
Wednesday, December 12, 2018;  15:00 – 18:00
Location:  Korea Pavilion

Sixth Global Climate Change Think Tank Forum: Global Climate Governance and a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind
Robert Stavins, Keynote Speaker
Hosted by the National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation (China)
Wednesday, December 12, 2018;  17:30 – 19:00
Location:  China Pavilion

Two Harvard Project Events in Detail

Elaborating and Implementing Article 6 of the Paris Agreement
Hosted by the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements and the Enel Foundation
Tuesday, December 11, 2018
15:00 – 16:30
Location:  Side Event Room “Wisla”

Participants:

Kelley Kizzier
Co-Chair, Article 6 negotiations
UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice

Michael Mehling
Deputy Director, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Daniele Agostini
Head of Low Carbon and European Energy Policies at Enel
Enel Group

Robert Stavins
A. J. Meyer Professor of Energy and Economic Development, Harvard Kennedy School
Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements

Other participant(s) to be determined

Abstract:

Speakers will consider progress in elaborating Article 6 and what remains to be done, with reference to the potential of Article 6 to enhance ambition. Discussion will be based on practical experience with market mechanisms, academic research, and a close reading of the Paris-Agreement negotiations. The discussion will be based in part on a background paper by Michael Mehling.

Governance of Solar Geoengineering Deployment
Hosted by the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements
Wednesday, December 12, 2018
11:00 – 12:30
Location:  Pavilion of the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA)

Participants:

Daniel Bodansky
Regents’ Professor
Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

David Keith
Gordon McKay Professor of Applied Physics, Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences
Faculty Director, Harvard’s Solar Geoengineering Research Program

Robert Stavins
A. J. Meyer Professor of Energy and Economic Development, Harvard Kennedy School
Director, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements

Other participant(s) to be determined

Abstract:

“Solar geoengineering” (SG) refers to technologies that help reduce radiative forcing and cool the planet. Governing SG deployment poses some unique challenges, in part driven by the incentive structure associated with SG, its risks and uncertainties, and its interaction with mitigation. Panelists will discuss these challenges and the potential role of SG in addressing climate change – relative to mitigation and adaptation. The panel is based in part on a research workshop held at Harvard Kennedy School in September 2018, which I wrote about in my previous entry at this blog.

The Path Ahead

After COP-24, I hope to post an essay at this blog assessing the progress (or lack thereof) made in Katowice.  In the meantime, if you will be at COP-24, and would like to meet with the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, please contact Jason Chapman (jason_chapman@hks.harvard.edu).

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