About the Author
Robert N. Stavins is the Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government, Director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program, and Chairman of the Environment and Natural Resources Faculty Group.
Tag Archives: Copenhagen Accord
A Challenge for Climate Negotiators, and an Opportunity for Scholars
As I have written in many previous essays at this blog, the challenges standing in the way of an effective international climate change agreement are numerous and severe. It is also true that the prospects for a truly meaningful deal … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Natural Resource Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Cancun Agreements, COP-15, COP-16, Copenhagen, Copenhagen Accord, Durban Platform, environmental politics, global climate policy, Harvard Kennedy School, Joseph Aldy, Kyoto Protocol, Major Economies Forum, UNFCCC
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If the Durban Platform Opened a Window, Will India and China Close It?
In my December 12th essay – following the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP-17) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which adjourned on December 11, 2011 – I offered my assessment of the Durban climate negotiations … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Politics, Positive Political Economy
Tagged berlin mandate, China, COP-15, COP-16, Copenhagen, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, distributional analysis, distributional equity, Durban Platform, environmental politics, global climate policy, India, international climate agreement, Kyoto Protocol, market-based environmental policies, National Commission on Energy Policy, Obama Administration, South Africa
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The Platform Opens a Window: An Unambiguous Consequence of the Durban Climate Talks
In my previous essay – following the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP-17) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which adjourned on December 11, 2011 – I offered my assessment of the Durban climate negotiations, addressing … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Natural Resource Policy, Politics, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Brazil, Cancun Agreements, China, common but differentiated responsibilities, COP-15, COP-16, COP-17, Copenhagen, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, distributional equity, Durban, Durban Platform, environmental politics, global climate policy, India, Kyoto Protocol, Mexico, Obama Administration, South Africa
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Assessing the Climate Talks — Did Durban Succeed?
The 17th Conference of the Parties (COP-17) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adjourned on Sunday, a day and a half after its scheduled close, and in the process once again pulled a rabbit out of … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Politics, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Australia, Brazil, China, common property resources, COP-17, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, distributional equity, Durban, environmental politics, European Union, global climate policy, India, Japan, Korea, Kyoto Protocol, Mexico, New Zealand, Obama Administration, South Africa
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Can the Durban Climate Negotiations Succeed?
Two weeks of international climate negotiations begin today in Durban, South Africa. These are the Seventeenth Conference of the Parties (COP-17) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The key challenge at this point is to maintain … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Politics, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Annex I, Australia, Bali, baseball, Cancun, cap-and-trade, COP-15, COP-16, COP-17, Copenhagen, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, Durban, environmental politics, European Union, g-20, global climate policy, India, Japan, Korea, Kyoto Protocol, law, linkage of cap-and-trade systems, Major Economies Forum, market-based environmental policies, New Zealand, Obama Administration, Poznan, regulation, South Africa, UNFCCC, United Nations
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Canada’s Step Away From the Kyoto Protocol Can Be a Constructive Step Forward
Canada confirmed this week that it will not take on a target under an extension of the Kyoto Protocol following the completion of the first commitment period, 2008-2012. Given that Canada is likely to miss by a wide margin its … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Annex I, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Cancun, China, COP-15, COP-16, COP-17, Copenhagen Accord, distributional equity, Durban, environmental politics, European Union, free rider problem, global climate policy, India, Japan, Korea, Kyoto Protocol, Mexico, New Zealand, Obama Administration, Russia, South Africa
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A Wave of the Future: International Linkage of National Climate Change Policies
The latest rage in Washington policy discussions these days (that’s relevant to climate change) is renewed interest in renewable electricity standards, this time in the form of so-called “clean energy standards.” I’ve written about this policy approach recently at this … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Australia, California, cap-and-trade, China, Clean Development Mechanism, Clean Energy Standards, COP-15, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, environmental politics, EPRI, European Union, global climate policy, IETA, India, Japan, Korea, linkage of cap-and-trade systems, market-based environmental policies, New Zealand, Obama Administration, regulation, renewable electricity standard, Renewable Portfolio Standard, revenue-neutral taxes, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, Waxman-Markey legislation
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Why Cancun Trumped Copenhagen
As we begin the year 2011, a look back at 2010 confirms that the greatest environmental achievement of the past year was the success that was achieved at the Sixteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-16) of the United Nations Framework … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Natural Resource Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Brazil, Cancun Agreements, China, Christiana Figueres, COP-15, Copenhagen Accord, environmental politics, European Union, G20, global climate policy, Green Climate Fund, India, Korea, Major Economies Forum, Mexico, Patricia Espinosa, South Africa, United Nations, United States, World Bank
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What Happened (and Why): An Assessment of the Cancun Agreements
The international climate negotiations in Cancun, Mexico, have concluded, and despite the gloom-and-doom predictions that dominated the weeks and months leading up to Cancun, the Sixteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-16) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Forest Policy, Natural Resource Policy
Tagged ALBA States, Australia, AWG-KP, AWG-LCA, Bolivia, Brazil, Cancun, CDM, China, Christiana Figueres, Climate Technology Center and Network, COP-15, COP-16, COP-17, Copenhagen, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, Council on Foreign Relations, Cuba, D, Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen, distributional equity, Durban, environmental politics, European Union, free rider problem, G20, global climate policy, Green Climate Fund, India, Japan, Korea, Major Economies Forum, market-based environmental policies, Mexico, Michael Levi, Nicaragua, Obama Administration, Patricia Espinosa, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, REDD+, South Africa, Sudan, Turkey, Venezuela
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Defining Success for Climate Negotiations in Cancun
International climate negotiations will continue in Cancun, Mexico, during the first two weeks of December, 2010. These will be the Sixteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-16) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The key challenge is … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Natural Resource Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Australia, Brazil, Cancun, China, COP-15, COP-16, Copenhagen, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, distributional equity, efficiency, environmental politics, European Union, free rider problem, George W. Bush, global climate policy, India, Japan, Korea, linkage of cap-and-trade systems, Major Economies Forum, market failure, market-based environmental policies, Mexico, New Zealand, Obama Administration, South Africa, Waxman-Markey legislation
7 Comments
Both Are Necessary, But Neither is Sufficient: Carbon-Pricing and Technology R&D Initiatives in a Meaningful National Climate Policy
For many years, there has been a great deal of discussion about carbon-pricing – whether carbon taxes or cap-and-trade – as an essential part of a meaningful national climate policy. It has long been recognized that although carbon-pricing will be … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Economic Stimulus Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Natural Resource Economics, Natural Resource Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged ARPA-E, cap-and-trade, carbon pricing, carbon tax, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, David Leonhardt, efficiency, environmental politics, externalities, free rider problem, global climate policy, green jobs, information problems, market failure, market-based environmental policies, New York Times, Obama Administration, patents, public goods, R&D, regulation, revenue-neutral taxes, Robert Hahn, technological change, technology innovation, technology R&D policies, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, Wall Street Journal, Waxman-Markey legislation
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Eyes on the Prize: Federal Climate Policy Should Preempt State and Regional Initiatives
In just a few days, Senators John Kerry, Lindsey Graham, and Joe Lieberman will release their much-anticipated proposal for comprehensive climate and energy legislation – the best remaining shot at forging a bipartisan consensus on this issue in 2010. Their … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Assembly Bill 32, building codes, California, cap-and-trade, carbon dioxide, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, environmental politics, free rider problem, global climate policy, greenhouse gases, information problems, market failure, market-based environmental policies, Massachusetts, Obama Administration, preemption, principal-agent problem, regulation, RGGI, Senator Graham, Senator Kerry, Senator Lieberman, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, Waxman-Markey legislation, zoning
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Opportunities and Ironies: Climate Policy in Tokyo, Seoul, Brussels, and Washington
As I write this, I’m on board a flight from Seoul, South Korea, to San Francisco, California, on my way home to Boston, having spent the week of Harvard spring break meeting with senior government officials, academics, and leaders of … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Australia, cap-and-trade, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, COP-15, COP-16, Copenhagen, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, distributional equity, environmental politics, G20, global climate policy, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Japan, Korea, Kyoto Protocol, lead trading, Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, Major Economies Forum, McCain-Lieberman legislation, Mexico, New Zealand, Obama Administration, OECD, Seoul, SO2 allowance trading, Tokyo, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, Waxman-Markey legislation
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Another Copenhagen Outcome: Serious Questions About the Best Institutional Path Forward
Whether you like it or not, for the time being the most important product of the December meeting in Copenhagen of the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-15) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Australia, Brazil, China, COP-15, Copenhagen, Copenhagen Accord, distributional equity, environmental politics, European Union, free rider problem, g-20, g-77, global climate policy, India, institutions, Japan, Korea, Major Economies Forum, Mexico, Obama Administration, South Africa, UNFCCC
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What Hath Copenhagen Wrought? A Preliminary Assessment of the Copenhagen Accord
After years of preparation, the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-15) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) commenced on December 7th, 2009, and adjourned some two weeks later on December 19th after a raucous all-night session. … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Forest Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Annex I, Asia-Pacific Economic Conference, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Brazilian President da Silva, cap-and-trade, China, common but differentiated responsibilities, Copenhagen, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, Cuba, distributional equity, environmental politics, European Union, finance, forestry, free rider problem, global climate policy, import allowance requirement, India, Indian Prime Minister Singh, Japan, Korea, Major Economies Forum, market-based environmental policies, Mexico, Nicaragua, Obama Administration, Portfolio Approach, Premier Wen Jiabo, South Africa, South African President Zuma, Sudan, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, UNFCCC, Venezuela, Waxman-Markey legislation
36 Comments