A Key Political Advisor Reflects on Progress and Prospects for Climate Policy

In my monthly podcast series, “Environmental Insights: Discussions on Policy and Practice from the Harvard Environmental Economics Program” (produced by the Harvard Environmental Economics Program), I’ve had the pleasure of engaging in conversations with individuals who have played very important roles in environmental and climate change policy, whether from within academia, government, NGOs, or private industry.  My most recent guest was certainly no exception, because I was joined by John Podesta, who has held numerous important positions in the U.S. government, starting with leading staff positions in the U.S. Senate, and then – more prominently – in the White House, serving in key roles under three U.S. presidents:  Clinton, Obama, and Biden.  Along the way, he founded the Center for American Progress and served as its first President and CEO.

Since my podcast and this blog are focused exclusively on environmental and energy policy, I should note up front that among his many government positions, he served as Senior Advisor to President Biden where he oversaw more than $750 billion in clean-energy investments under the Inflation Reduction Act, and then succeeded John Kerry as U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate.  I hope you will listen to our conversation here.

In the podcast, John Podesta shares his insights on climate policy, the challenges of securing bipartisan support, and the global push toward clean energy.  He begins with some reflections on the Inflation Reduction Act:

“It was an investment-led strategy, private sector-led, although government-enabled strategy to boost investment, innovation, job creation, cost reductions, and it covered every emitting sector of the economy, unlike efforts in the past that really just focused on power production or transportation when very little attention was being paid to the emissions that [were] the result of land use or industrial process,” he remarks. “The world saw [the IRA] as the United States really getting in the game in a very positive way… Even our European colleagues… did not see this as a zero-sum game and we thought that the improvements, the innovations, the ability to create a green hydrogen industry was going to benefit the world, including Europe and European companies.”

John maintains that the IRA also served U.S. international relations interests in important ways:

“It gave us a way to partner with others who were also worried about economic domination in these [clean energy] sectors, that they would be left out and left behind, and notwithstanding that some cheap Chinese clean technology was flooding the market,” he says. “It was kind of undermining domestic investment in places like Brazil, like India. And they saw the U.S. as a reliable partner in saying that we need to… share a vision, but we also need to attend to our own domestic populations and make sure we’re building strong economies.”

But Podesta goes on to describe how everything changed when the Trump administration came to power, which he characterizes as undermining much of the climate progress that had been made during the Obama and Biden administrations.

“We’re in a period of under President Trump with ideology that is definitely hostile to the development of the clean energy economy and indeed in dealing with climate change… I sometimes describe this administration as the Empire Strikes Back. We saw a huge boost in investment in clean technology, and now we’re seeing reversal of that with a substantial loss of jobs, prices rising. And it’s interesting because it’s happening in the middle of the first time in a generation… of increasing demand for electricity,” he says “We see this booming demand for electricity, and [Trump has] taken off the table the cheapest, cleanest, reliable, and deployable sources of energy. Maybe the iconic example is the war we see on offshore wind in the Northeast and New England.”

On the upside, Podesta remarks, international efforts to reduce emissions and address climate change are moving in the right direction.

“The overall picture across the globe is to spur investment innovation in these technologies as opposed to polluting fossil fuels and that is happening virtually everywhere except the United States… and a couple of others who are resisting that trend. But I think at a political level, and certainly at a technical and scientific level, the damage that is resulting from a warming planet is obvious and people are trying to do something about it,” he says. “Whether that’s in the big economies in Europe or the big economies in Asia, the push is towards trying to develop cleaner resources and less polluting resources, trying to invest in adaptation and resilience, trying to find a way to get financial flows going to support that transition.”

For this and much more, please listen to my complete podcast conversation with John Podesta, the 70th episode over the past five years of the Environmental Insights series, with future episodes scheduled to drop each month.  You can find a transcript of our conversation at the website of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program.  Previous episodes have featured conversations with:

  • Gina McCarthy, former Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
  • Nick Stern of the London School of Economics discussing his career, British politics, and efforts to combat climate change
  • Andrei Marcu, founder and executive director of the European Roundtable on Climate Change and Sustainable Transition
  • Paul Watkinson, Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
  • Jos Delbekeprofessor at the European University Institute in Florence and at the KU Leuven in Belgium, and formerly Director-General of the European Commission’s DG Climate Action
  • David Keith, professor at Harvard and a leading authority on geoengineering
  • Joe Aldy, professor of the practice of public policy at Harvard Kennedy School, with considerable experience working on climate change policy issues in the U.S. government
  • Scott Barrett,  professor of natural resource economics at Columbia University, and an authority on infectious disease policy
  • Rebecca Henderson, John and Natty McArthur University Professor at Harvard University, and founding co-director of the Business and Environment Initiative at Harvard Business School.
  • Sue Biniaz, who was the lead climate lawyer and a lead climate negotiator for the United States from 1989 until early 2017.
  • Richard Schmalensee, the Howard W. Johnson Professor of Management, and Professor of Economics Emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
  • Kelley Kizier, Associate Vice President for International Climate at the Environmental Defense Fund.
  • David Hone, Chief Climate Change Adviser, Shell International.
  • Vicky Bailey, 30 years of experience in corporate and government positions in the energy sector. 
  • David Victor, professor of international relations at the University of California, San Diego.
  • Lisa Friedman, reporter on the climate desk at the The New York Times.
  • Coral Davenport, who covers energy and environmental policy for The New York Times from Washington.
  • Spencer Dale, BP Group Chief Economist.
  • Richard Revesz, professor at the NYU School of Law.
  • Daniel Esty, Hillhouse Professor of Environment and Law at Yale University. 
  • William Hogan, Raymond Plank Research Professor of Global Energy Policy at Harvard.
  • Jody Freeman, Archibald Cox Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.
  • John Graham, Dean Emeritus, Paul O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University.
  • Gernot Wagner, Clinical Associate Professor at New York University.
  • John Holdren, Research Professor, Harvard Kennedy School.
  • Larry Goulder, Shuzo Nishihara Professor of Environmental and Resource Economics, Stanford University.
  • Suzi Kerr, Chief Economist, Environmental Defense Fund.
  • Sheila Olmstead, Professor of Public Affairs, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, Austin.
  • Robert Pindyck, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Professor of Economics and Finance, MIT Sloan School of Management.
  • Gilbert Metcalf, Professor of Economics, Tufts University.
  • Navroz Dubash, Professor, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.
  • Paul Joskow, Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics emeritus, MIT.
  • Maureen Cropper, Distinguished University Professor, University of Maryland.
  • Orley Ashenfelter, the Joseph Douglas Green 1895 Professor of Economics, Princeton University.
  • Jonathan Wiener, the William and Thomas Perkins Professor of Law, Duke Law School.
  • Lori Bennear, the Juli Plant Grainger Associate Professor of Energy Economics and Policy, Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University.
  • Daniel Yergin, founder of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, and now Vice Chair of S&P Global.
  • Jeffrey Holmstead, who leads the Environmental Strategies Group at Bracewell in Washington, DC.
  • Daniel Jacob, Vasco McCoy Family Professor of Atmospheric Chemistry & Environmental Engineering at Harvard.
  • Michael Greenstone, Milton Friedman Distinguished Service Professor of Economics, University of Chicago.
  • Billy Pizer, Vice President for Research & Policy Engagement, Resources for the Future. 
  • Daniel Bodansky, Regents’ Professor, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University.
  • Catherine Wolfram, Cora Jane Flood Professor of Business Administration, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, currently on leave at the Harvard Kennedy School.
  • James Stock, Harold Hitchings Burbank Professor of Political Economy, Harvard University.
  • Mary Nichols, long-time leader in California, U.S., and international climate change policy.
  • Geoffrey Heal, Donald Waite III Professor of Social Enterprise, Columbia Business School.
  • Kathleen Segerson, Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of Economics, University of Connecticut.
  • Meredith Fowlie, Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics, U.C. Berkeley. 
  • Karen Palmer, Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future.
  • Severin Borenstein, Professor of the Graduate School, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley.
  • Michael Toffel, Senator John Heinz Professor of Environmental Management and Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School.
  • Emma Rothschild, Jeremy and Jane Knowles Professor of History, Harvard University.
  • Nathaniel Keohane, President, C2ES.
  • Amy Harder, Executive Editor, Cypher News.
  • Richard Zeckhauser, Frank Ramsey Professor of Political Economy, Harvard Kennedy School.
  • Kimberly (Kim) Clausing, School of Law, University of California at Los Angeles
  • Hunt Allcott, Professor of Global Environmental Policy, Stanford Doerr School of Sustainability.
  • Meghan O’Sullivan, Jeane Kirkpatrick Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School.
  • Robert Lawrence, Albert Williams Professor of International Trade and Investment, Harvard Kennedy School.
  • Charles Taylor, Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School.
  • Wolfram Schlenker, Ray Goldberg Professor of the Global Food System, Harvard Kennedy School.
  • Karen Fisher-Vanden, Professor of Environmental & Resource Economics, Pennsylvania State University
  • Max Bearak, climate and energy reporter, New York Times
  • Vijay Vaitheeswaran, global energy and climate innovation editor, The Economist
  • Joseph Aldy, Teresa & John Heinz Professor of the Practice of Environmental Policy, Harvard Kennedy School
  • Nicholas Burns, Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations, Harvard Kennedy School
  • Elaine Buckberg, Senior Fellow, Salata Institute for Climate and Sustainability, Harvard University
  • Anna Russo, Junior Fellow, Harvard University

“Environmental Insights” is hosted on SoundCloud, and is also available on iTunesPocket CastsSpotify, and Stitcher.

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Looking Back, Looking Forward: Implications of Trump 2.0

            This is a blog essay I have been dreading having to write, because I knew that writing it would be painful, if not downright depressing.  However, I also felt that it is a blog essay that I am obliged to write. 

Why Am I Obliged to Write This Essay?

Three reasons.  First, back in October 2016, as that year’s Election Day approached, I came out of my political closet (as a long-time bipartisan and moderate independent), and revealed my great concerns, indeed fears, of what a Trump presidency would mean – not just for environmental and climate change policy, but for a much larger set of issues with profound consequences domestically and internationally (This is Not a Time for Political Neutrality).  I wrote about “what a Trump presidency would mean for my country and for the world in realms ranging from economic progress to national security to personal liberty,” based on Trump’s “own words in a [2016] campaign in which he substituted impulse and pandering for thoughtful politics” … and “built his populist campaign on false allegations about others, personal insults of anyone who disagreed with him, and displays of breathtaking xenophobia, veiled racism, and unapologetic sexism.”

Second, just a week after Trump’s surprising win over Hilary Clinton, I turned my focus in this blog to considering carefully the implications of the (first) Trump administration for environmental, energy, and climate change policy and action (What Does the Trump Victory Mean for Climate Change Policy?).  I’m pleased to say that much (but not all) of what I feared that first Trump administration would bring did not occur, for four reasons, among others:  (a) the incompetence of the administration, particularly in regard to producing regulatory changes that would withstand legal challenges (Reflecting on Trump’s Record); (b) some Trump appointees provided guardrails protecting the country from the President’s worse instincts; (c) the (Democratic) Congress provided significant checks; and (d) dedicated, expert staff in the various departments and agencies (and even in the Executive Office of the President) were determined to resist the undoing of decades of sound public policy.

Third, in January 2021, just days before the inauguration of President Biden, I wrote in some detail about what I expected the consequences to be for domestic and international climate change policy of the then forthcoming Biden administration.  For better or for worse, much of what I anticipated, did indeed subsequently come to pass (Climate Change Policy & Action in the Biden Administration).

            So, now with Trump 2.0 two months away, I feel obliged to offer my thoughts about the forthcoming administration’s implications for climate change policy and action.  I need not point out that none of the four reasons I listed above to explain why much of what I feared from the first Trump administration did not occur, apply for the second Trump administration.

A Very Important Caveat Before Turning to Climate Change Policy

            I want to acknowledge that my major reactions to the Trump victory and my major concerns about the forthcoming Trump administration are not about climate change policy or even environmental policy more broadly, but about: the future of American democracy; global security (the future of NATO and the stability of the European Union); the real economic consequences of across-the-board tariffs (consumer costs, inflation); tax cuts for the rich; mass deportations; and leadership by uninformed demagogues – Matt Gaetz as Attorney General, RFK Jr as Secretary of Health and Human Services, Peter Hegseth as Secretary of Defense, Elon Musk on economic policy and business regulation, and so many others.  The four I name are not just bad appointments, but absolutely appalling ones, who share the one characteristic that apparently matters – blind loyalty to the authoritarian who has been elected President.

            But my expertise is not in the study of democratic institutions, international affairs, macroeconomics, or immigration policy, but in the study of environmental and climate change economics and policy.  So, I will turn to this now, and I will be brief, partly because we will learn much over the coming two months, as more cabinet-level and then lower-level nominations are announced.  My other reason for being brief is that, as I suggested at the outset, it is painful to write this essay, and so I want to finish writing as quickly as I can.  I apologize for that.

International Climate Change Policy

            In terms of the international dimensions of climate change policy, that is, cooperation with other countries in addressing a fundamentally global commons problem of massive magnitude, the focus needs to be on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Paris Agreement, and the annual Conferences of the Parties.  Having just returned from COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, my next blog essay will focus on that and will appear in a week or so, after COP29 has adjourned and the outcome has become clear.  So, for now, I will stick to some broad observations about the consequences of Trump 2.0 for the international domain.

            In short, it is 2016 all over again, when Trump stated during the campaign that he would withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement, and then announced the “withdrawal” on June 1, 2017.  As I wrote at the time (Trump’s Paris Withdrawal: The Nail in the Coffin of U.S. Global Leadership?), the Paris Agreement itself specifies that the soonest any Party to the Agreement can initiate withdrawal is three years after the Agreement comes into force, followed by a one-year delay before withdrawal takes effect.  Hence, Trump’s announcement did not take effect until November of 2020!  For almost the entirety of Trump 1.0, the United States remained a Party to the Paris Agreement, and dedicated staff from the U.S. State Department continued to participate in the ongoing negotiations in meaningful ways.

Hence, the United States was out of the Paris Agreement for just a few months – from November 2020 until a month after Inauguration Day, January 20, 2021, when President Biden filed the paperwork for the U.S. to rejoin 30 days later.

            Now, however, the statutory three-year delay period has long since passed, and so assuming that Trump files the withdrawal papers on January 20, 2025 (which is likely, given the much more careful preparations his supporters have been making for the past year), one year later the U.S. will be alone among the community of nations as a non-Party of this fundamental and path-breaking Agreement (after some delay, Iran and Algeria ratified the Agreement).  Furthermore, it is much less likely that Civil Service staffers at the State Department, EPA, or the Department of Energy will be able to continue their work, as Trump 2.0 seems determined to purge the upper ranks of the Civil Service of anyone other than Trump loyalists (by making these positions require political appointment).

            A more drastic action would be to withdraw the United States not just from the Paris Agreement of 2015, but from the umbrella agreement, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992).  Ironically, this requires only a one-year delay to become effective after filing paperwork.  During Trump 1.0, serious consideration was never given to this more significant move, perhaps because the UNFCCC was ratified (by voice vote with apparent unanimity) by the U.S. Senate in 1992 and signed by Republican President George H.W. Bush.

Now, some of the most passionate climate skeptics in Trump’s orbit want the U.S. to pull out of the UNFCCC as well.  A key question, which legal scholars will debate, is whether withdrawal requires Senate action, including a super-majority vote, which Democrats in the chamber could easily defeat.  There seems to be some uncertainty.  While Senate action is required to ratify treaties, Senate involvement in withdrawal is not mandated nor even mentioned in the U.S. Constitution.  But Presidents have previously withdrawn from treaties unilaterally.  That said, this apparently remains a debated issue in U.S. constitutional law.

In the meantime, a key question is what will the effect of U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement – or more broadly, the election results and the promise of Trump 2.0 – have on other countries’ climate stances and policies.  As of now, it seems that Trump’s election need not derail global climate action, but it is too soon to make firm predictions.  It does appear that Trump’s victory may have emboldened Saudi Arabia to be much more strident in its defense of fossil fuels at COP29 (more about this in my next blog essay).

Domestic U.S. Climate Change Policy

            It is already evident that the key appointments in the energy, environment, and climate change space in the new administration will be held by individuals with histories of strident opposition to climate policies and equally strong support for fossil fuels.  Examples include Trump’s choice for Secretary of Energy – Chris Wright, a fracking booster and climate skeptic, Lee Zeldin as Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and a number of others.

            It also seems clear that the new administration will try to roll back many provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), and perhaps some provisions of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Act.  Actual repeal of the statutes is unlikely, due to Senate filibuster rules (i.e., the necessity of 60 votes, more than Republicans will control).  In the face of this, the Biden administration is rushing to finalize regulations, and to get IRA money (explicit subsidies) out the door.  Beyond this, the White House has considerable latitude to defund elements of the IRA, since nearly all are explicit or implicit subsidies.  The methane fee will be a particular target.

On the other hand, the protectionist elements of the IRA, including domestic content standards, will be harder to roll back, because of bipartisan support.  Furthermore, fully 80% of investments in the first two years of IRA implementation went to Republican Congressional districts, whether locations for electric vehicle plants in Georgia, battery factories in South Carolina, or others.

It is also important to recognize that the tremendous reductions that have been experienced over recent years in U.S. carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions were not due to government policies, but largely a result of exogenous technological change and market forces, namely the development of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing (fracking), which resulted in opening up new, low-cost, unconventional sources of both natural gas and oil.  This is what led to the massive substitution in U.S. electricity generation from major reliance on coal to major reliance on gas.  Added to this are the very significant decreases experienced over the past few years in the costs of renewable sources – both solar and wind.  None of this will go away.

Finally, the November election brought a small, but meaningful bit of positive climate policy news when Washington State voters decided not to repeal the state’s Cap-and-Invest (cap-and-trade) program.  Linkage discussions with California and Quebec will soon commence, if they have not already.  Overall, this is a reminder of the fact that the next four years (at least) will again be a period when sub-national climate policy is increasingly important in the USA.  For the time being, this is the best I can do at trying to offer a somewhat positive end to this essay.  I wish I could do better.

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An Experienced Economist Reflects on Government Service, Carbon Pricing, and Climate Policy

Having served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Climate & Energy Economics in the U.S. Department of the Treasury in 2021-2022, Catherine Wolfram has some particularly relevant insights to offer on the development and implementation of climate change policy in the most recent episode of my monthly podcast.  Wolfram is the Cora Jane Flood Professor of Business Administration at the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, currently on leave at the Harvard Kennedy School.  In the podcast, we discuss her time in government service and her thoughts and hopes for a carbon pricing scheme.  You’ll find this and much more in the newest episode of “Environmental Insights: Discussions on Policy and Practice from the Harvard Environmental Economics Program,” a podcast produced by the Harvard Environmental Economics Program.  I hope you will listen to our complete conversation here.

In this new podcast episode, Catherine Wolfram, who earned her PhD in Economics from MIT, begins by reflecting on her service in the Biden Administration, and she does so in very positive terms, saying that it was an “honor and thrill of a lifetime.”

“I would say the high point was definitely the work on the price cap on Russian oil. That was the main thing that I spent time on in the last 10 months of my time at Treasury, and was absolutely fascinating from so many different perspectives,” she says. “I learned a lot about foreign diplomacy, or I should say that I observed foreign diplomacy in action.”

During her time at the Treasury Department, Congress passed the Inflation Reduction Act, important legislation that authorizes $391 billion in spending on energy and climate change initiatives, making it the most important climate legislation ever enacted in the United States.

“A lot of the Inflation Reduction Act is being implemented through tax credits, and that’s Treasury’s purview, so [although] it was not my office within Treasury (it was another office, the Office of Tax Policy), I … [attended] many meetings about what started out as the Build Back Better Act and became the Inflation Reduction Act. So, that was really fun to see, and is certainly a momentous piece of legislation,” she remarks.

Despite the reliance on subsidies (tax credits) in the Inflation Reduction Act, Catherine says that she remains optimistic about the potential role of carbon pricing in climate change policy.

“I would not call carbon pricing dead,” she argues. “I could see it coming back in some form, maybe not the economy-wide carbon price that textbooks favor, but maybe something that starts, for instance, with the industrial sector … on a more limited scale.”

More broadly, Wolfram expresses optimism that the international community will figure out creative ways to adopt climate policies that will make a positive difference.

“I think if the G7 countries can get together and figure out how to put a price cap on Russian oil, [then] hopefully the G7 countries can get together and figure out good ways to use their presence in the international trade community to address climate change.”

However, Catherine also expresses concern about the possibility that an overreliance on tax credits and government subsidies in the design of climate policy could set back efforts to impose effective carbon pricing.  

“I worry that there’s a future that evolves where the European Union gets pressure from its industry, and loses enthusiasm for its carbon price, and so the competitive pressures from industry that are seeing these subsidies over in the U.S., and thinking of moving to the U.S., that causes the EU to backtrack on climate policy, just because we have these different approaches to reducing emissions.”

For this and much, much more, I encourage you to listen to this 44th episode of the Environmental Insights series, with future episodes scheduled to drop each month.  You can find a transcript of our conversation at the website of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program.  Previous episodes have featured conversations with:

“Environmental Insights” is hosted on SoundCloud, and is also available on iTunes, Pocket Casts, Spotify, and Stitcher.

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