Carbon Pricing, the COVID-19 Pandemic, and Green Economic Recovery

In our most recent (September 8th) webinar in our series, Conversations on Climate Change and Energy Policy, sponsored by the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements (HPCA), I had the pleasure of chatting with Joseph Stiglitz, University Professor at Columbia University.  This webinar series features leading authorities on climate change policy, whether from academia, the private sector, NGOs, or government.  A video recording and transcript of the webinar are available here.

In this case, my guest has had his feet planted firmly in more than one of those realms.  In addition to being a long-time faculty member at Columbia, Joe Stiglitz is Co-Chair of the High-Level Expert Group on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress at the OECD, and Chief Economist of the Roosevelt Institute.  Among the many positions he has held, he was a Member and then Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers in the Clinton administration, and subsequently Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank.

He received the John Bates Clark Medal from the American Economic Association in 1979, and the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2001.  In addition, he is Fellow of the National Academy of Sciences, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Philosophical Society, and the Econometric Society.

I first met Joe in 1993 when he was a Member of President Clinton’s CEA, and then again on a long flight to Seoul, Korea, when we were both attending the initial meeting of the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

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In our wide-ranging conversation, Joe Stiglitz shares his thoughts on carbon pricing, post-pandemic economic recovery, green economy transition, and much more.

Stiglitz explains that he favors a multi-faceted strategy to address climate change and to spur the transition to a green economy – including public investments, research and development, regulations, and carbon pricing. Such a “carbon package,” he says, can serve as a long-term economic stimulus because it will encourage companies to retrofit their operations, thereby spurring private investment and innovation. “And that’s the sense in which it will be a growth story. It will actually make for a more dynamic economy.” 

The economic impacts of COVID-19 may have temporarily diverted resources away from climate change efforts, Stiglitz remarks, but the post-pandemic period will bring tremendous opportunities to integrate green policies into economic recovery plans in the United States and elsewhere. “The pandemic has brought to light some of the real weaknesses in our economy. It has certainly made us more aware that we need to be better prepared for the risks that we face. One of those risks was the pandemic that we hadn’t thought about, and the other one is something we know about, which is climate risk,” he says.

Discussing public investments moving forward, Stiglitz remarks, “From my perspective, we as citizens have the right to make sure that that money serves a dual purpose – not only the purpose of bringing the economy back, [but] back in a way that is more consistent with the vision that we want of the post-pandemic economy and society. And that means a more equal society, I hope, a more knowledge-based society, and a much greener economy.”

He highlights two examples of national recovery plans that include green elements – in France, where the Air France rescue package includes provisions that the airline reduce its carbon footprint; and in New Zealand, where unemployed and underemployed citizens were hired to improve public parks, which serve as popular tourist destinations. And he cites the European Union’s “Green Deal” as an example of a multilateral effort to hasten the transition to a green economy, and he likens it to a wartime effort to address a visceral threat.

“What we are talking about here is heavy mobilization of resources,” he says. “Sometimes I use the metaphor of a Green New Deal wartime mobilization. The difference is that you see your enemy right in front of you in war. The effects of climate change we are seeing right in front of us – in the fires, the hurricanes, the floods, but some people are not seeing it as clearly as we would see a military attack.”

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When we are half of the way through the one-hour conversation, I pose some questions submitted by members of the virtual audience, on issues ranging from the challenges facing developing countries to the economic capacity necessary to move the needle on climate change. 

When asked what approach he would advocate to achieve widespread policy support for achieving net CO2 emissions reductions by the year 2040, Stiglitz remarks that, “I think that as a recognition that we all share the planet and carbon molecules don’t carry passports, that we’re in this together. There is a shared concern. Hopefully that will be enough to enable people to come to agreement on what a fair sharing of the burden is.”

Beyond this, Stiglitz explains that there is plenty that individuals can do to help in the fight against climate change.  “We all have multiple roles in our society. We are consumers. We are workers. We are citizens. As citizens, we have an important role in advocacy, in helping change the political process to help deal with carbon and the green transition. The only way these problems will be solved is when we have proper public policy.”

“As consumers, I think we also have roles, moving more towards greener housing, greener eating, greener transportation. We make lots of decisions, as individuals, we do savings, and we could put our money into portfolios that are greener. We can express our values through how we allocate our portfolios.”

“As workers, I think it’s important to articulate to the extent that we can, and in some firms there’s a greater openness than others, that we ought to be thinking of moving towards greener. I would argue it’s better for the companies…if they’re ready for the green transition,” he states. “I think there are lots of individual actions, and if we’re going to move our society, it will take lots of these adding up together to succeed.”

All of this and more can be heard and seen at this website.  I hope you will check it out.

Previous webinar in this series – Conversations on Climate Change and Energy Policy – have featured Meghan O’Sullivan’s thoughts on Geopolitics and Upheaval in Oil Markets, Jake Werksman’s assessment of the European Union’s Green New Deal, Rachel Kyte’s examination of “Using the Pandemic Recovery to Spur the Clean Transition.”

The next HPCA Conversation on Climate Change and Energy Policy is scheduled for October 19th with guest Joseph Aldy, Professor of the Practice of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School.  Please register in advance for this event on the HPCA website.

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If the Durban Platform Opened a Window, Will India and China Close It?

In my December 12th essay – following the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP-17) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which adjourned on December 11, 2011 – I offered my assessment of the Durban climate negotiations by taking note of three major outcomes of the negotiations:  (1) elaboration on several components of the Cancun Agreements; (2) a second five-year commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol; and (3) a “non-binding agreement to reach an agreement” by 2015 that will bring all countries under the same legal regime by 2020.   Subsequently, in my January 1st essay – The Platform Opens a Window: An Unambiguous Consequence of the Durban Climate Talks – I focused on the third outcome of the talks, the “Durban Platform for Enhanced Action.”

Some Necessary History

The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted at the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (the first “Earth Summit”) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, contains what was to become a crucial passage:  “The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.” [emphasis added]  The countries considered to be “developed country Parties” were listed in an appendix to the 1992 Convention ­– Annex I.

The phrase – common but differentiated responsibilities – was given a specific interpretation three years after the Earth Summit by the first decision adopted by the first Conference of the Parties (COP-1) of the U.N. Framework Convention, in Berlin, Germany, April 7, 1995 ­­– the all important Berlin Mandate, which interpreted the principle as:  (1) launching a process to commit (by 1997) the Annex I countries to quantified greenhouse gas emissions reductions within specified time periods (targets and timetables); and (2) stating unambiguously that the process should “not introduce any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex I.”

Thus, the Berlin Mandate established the dichotomous distinction whereby the Annex I countries are to take on emissions-reductions responsibilities, and the non-Annex I countries are to have no such responsibilities whatsoever.  This had wide-ranging and profound consequences, because it became the anchor that prevented real progress in international climate negotiations.  With 50 non-Annex I countries having greater per capita income than the poorest of the Annex I countries, the distinction is clearly out of whack.

But, more important than that, this dichotomous distinction means that:  (a) half of global emissions soon will be from nations without constraints; (b) the world’s largest emitter – China – is unconstrained; (c) aggregate compliance costs are driven up to be four times their cost-effective level, because many opportunities for low-cost emissions abatement in emerging economies are taken off the table; and (d) an institutional structure is perpetuated that makes change and progress virtually impossible.

The dichotomous Annex I/non-Annex I distinction remained a central – indeed, the central – feature of international climate negotiations ever since COP-1 in Berlin in 1995.  Then, at COP-15 in 2009, there were hints of possible change.

The Copenhagen Accord (2009) and the Cancun Agreements (2010) began a process of blurring the Annex I/non-Annex I distinction.  But this blurring was only in the context of the interim pledge-and-review system established at COP-15 in Copenhagen and certified at COP-16 in Cancun, not in the context of an eventual successor to the Kyoto Protocol.  Thus, the Berlin Mandate retained its centrality.

The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action

The third of the three outcomes of the December 2011 talks in Durban, South Africa – the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action – eliminates the Annex I/non-Annex I (or industrialized/developing country) distinction.  In the Durban Platform, the delegates reached a non-binding agreement to reach an agreement by 2015 that will bring all countries under the same legal regime by 2020.  That’s a strange sentence, but it’s important.

Rather than adopting the Annex I/non-Annex I (or industrialized/developing country) distinction, the Durban Platform focuses instead on the pledge to create a system of greenhouse gas reductions including all Parties (that is, all key countries) by 2015 that will come into force by 2020.  Nowhere in the text of the decision are phrases such as “Annex I,” “common but differentiated responsibilities,” “distributional equity,” “historical responsibility,” all of which had long since become code words for targets for the richest countries and blank checks for all others.

Thus, in a dramatic departure from some seventeen years of U.N. international negotiations on climate change, the 17th Conference of the Parties in Durban turned away from the Annex I/non-Annex I distinction, which had been the centerpiece of international climate policy and negotiations since it was adopted at the 1st Conference of the Parties in Berlin in 1995.  In truth, only time will tell whether the Durban Platform delivers on its promise, or turns out to be another “Bali Roadmap,” leading nowhere, but there is a key unambiguous consequence of this development.

Durban Opens a Window

By replacing the Berlin Mandate, the Durban Platform has opened an important window.  National delegations from around the world now have a challenging task before them:  to identify a new international climate policy architecture that is consistent with the process, pathway, and principles laid out in the Durban Platform, namely to find a way to include all key countries (such as the 20 largest national and regional economies that together account for upwards of 80% of global carbon dioxide emissions) in a structure that brings about meaningful emissions reductions on an appropriate timetable at acceptable cost, while remaining within the overall framework provided by the UNFCCC.

Is India Seeking to Close the Window?

As part of the agreement to launch the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, the nations of the world agreed to initiate a work plan on enhancing mitigation ambition.  As a first step, each country was to submit its initial ideas.

On February 28, 2012, the Indian government made its official submission to the UNFCCC, “Increasing Ambition Level under Durban Platform for Enhanced Action.”  In seventeen paragraphs across three pages of text, India’s submission makes absolutely clear its view that the Durban Platform is under the overall legal umbrella of the UNFCCC, and therefore that the principles of “equity” and “common but differentiated responsibilities” remain intact and must inform all commitments for enhanced action.  In fact, the lion’s share of India’s submission talks about the responsibilities of industrialized countries, not about India’s ideas for its own contributions.

India’s submission actually quantifies what it sees as the necessary future commitments of Annex I (“developed”) countries – by referring to the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change:  “AR4 has recommended that Annex I Parties should reduce their emissions at least by 25-40% in the short term by 2020” [emphasis added].  But, in truth, AR4 made no such recommendation.  Indeed, the IPCC – in general – does not make any policy recommendations whatsoever.  This is one of the key organizing principles under which the IPCC operates.  I know this from decades of direct work with the IPCC, having served as a Lead Author in two rounds of the IPCC, and currently serving as a Coordinating Lead Author in AR5.

China Weighs In

A week after India made its submission, the Chinese government followed suit on March 8th with “China’s Submission on Options and Ways for Further Increasing the Level of Ambition.”  The submission is consistent with India’s, maintaining that industrialized countries alone bear responsibility for reducing emissions before 2020:  “Developed country Parties should take the lead in reducing their emissions by undertaking ambitious mitigation commitments and fulfill their obligations by providing financial resources and transferring technology to developing country Parties.”

They Have a Point

India and China have a point.  The Durban Platform did not supplant the Convention, so the general notions of “equity” and “common but differentiated responsibilities” do remain.  But – and here is the key reality – the Durban Platform did replace the Berlin Mandate.  And so a window has been opened to explore new, more sophisticated, and more subtle ways of involving all key countries in an environmentally effective and cost-effective global agreement, with a new interpretation of common but differentiated responsibilities.

For example, replacing the dichotomous Annex I/non-Annex I distinction with a formula that generates a continuous spectrum of degrees of responsibility would be fully consistent both with the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action and the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change.  Such a formulaic approach – as developed by Professors Jeffrey Frankel and Valentina Bosetti for the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements – merits serious consideration, along with other innovative international policy architectures.

Although some in the press and blogosphere have characterized the Chinese and Indian submissions as hitting “the brakes on Durban pledges” and “hitting the reset button on international climate change commitments,” in reality the Chinese and Indian submissions refer only to emission reductions prior to 2020, whereas the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action focuses on (agreeing by 2015 on) a new international agreement that would be implemented only in 2020.  Thus, there’s no inconsistency.

Stay Tuned

Whether or not the submissions by China and India are part of a diplomatic dance or represent a real step backward from their positions in Durban, the fact remains that the Durban Platform – by replacing the Berlin Mandate – has opened an important window.  Governments around the world need fresh, outside-of-the-box ideas over the next few years of a possible future international climate policy architecture that can meet the call of the Durban Platform while remaining true to the Framework Convention on Climate Change.  That’s the challenge, as well as the opportunity.

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Worried About International Competitiveness? Another Look at the Waxman-Markey Cap-and-Trade Proposal

The potential impacts of proposed U.S. climate policies on the competitiveness of U.S. industries is a major political issue, and it was one of the key issues in the Energy and Commerce Committee of the House of Representatives in the design of Henry Waxman and Edward Markey’s H.R. 2454 (the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009). In the floor debate that will soon take place as the full House considers the bill, it will be an important issue. It promises to be an equally important topic when the Senate takes up its own climate legislation, although the debate in that body on this issue will likely be quite different.

The ultimate answer to the question of how best to address concerns about international competitiveness is to bring all countries – both the industrialized nations and the developing world’s large, rapidly-growing economies (China, India, Brazil, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, and Indonesia) – into a meaningful (post-Kyoto) international climate change agreement (a topic on which I’ve spent much time over the past several years).  But – for the most part — that long-term objective is outside of the reach of the domestic policy of any single nation, even the United States.

Can Domestic Climate Policy Address Competitiveness Concerns?

A range of approaches has been considered for implementing sound, domestic climate policy while seeking to “level the economic playing field” with other countries. While no approach is without its flaws (as I describe below), the approach taken in the Waxman-Markey legislation is sensible and pragmatic:  in the short term, output-based updating allocations of allowances are employed for a few energy-intensive, trade-sensitive sectors; and in the long term, the President is given the option to put in place (under specific, stringent conditions) import-allowance-requirements in selected cases.

In order to explain my reasoning for coming to this conclusion, let’s back up for a moment and reflect on the reasons for the high level of political attention and receptiveness in the United States toward employing a cap-and-trade system nationally to address emissions of greenhouse gases.

It is because of the significant economic and political advantages of cap-and-trade systems to address carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions that most (but not all) attention by policy makers has been focused on this policy approach. First, it provides a cost-effective means of achieving meaningful reductions in emissions over relevant time horizons. Second, it offers an easy means of compensating for the inevitably unequal burdens imposed by virtually any climate policy. Third, it is less likely than alternative approaches (such as a carbon tax) to be degraded – in terms of environmental performance and cost-effectiveness – by political forces. Fourth, it has a history of successful adoption and implementation over two decades. And fifth, it provides a straightforward means to link and harmonize with other countries’ climate policies.

The Waxman-Markey bill, H.R. 2454, would establish such a U.S. cap-and-trade system to reduce emissions that contribute to global climate change. The bill would put a declining cap on emissions and create a corresponding number of emission permits. Regulated firms could trade these permits at a price determined by the market – creating powerful incentives to reduce emissions cost-effectively.

But imposing a price (cost) on carbon in the United States at a time when some other countries (in the developing world) are not taking comparable actions raises concerns about negative impacts on the competitiveness of U.S. industry, particularly in energy-intensive, trade-sensitive sectors. This heightens worries about possible job losses, a particularly troubling concern when the United States find itself in the worst global recession in a generation.

The environmental side of the same coin is “carbon leakage.” Again, imposing a cost on the production of carbon-intensive goods and services shifts comparative advantage in the production of those same goods and services in the direction of countries not taking on such costs.  Also, reduced demand in the United States for carbon-intensive fuels such as coal can be expected to reduce worldwide demand enough that the world price of coal would fall, thereby making it more attractive for use in countries that are not participating in a meaningful international climate agreement (or otherwise taking significant domestic climate actions).

Both routes can result in a shift of carbon-intensive production to countries without climate controls, and therefore an increase in their CO2 emissions. This is carbon leakage, which reduces the environmental benefits of mitigating emissions and reduces cost-effectiveness of any actions (properly measured in terms of net changes in CO2 atmospheric concentrations).  Given that the United States, the European Union, and Japan are net importers of embodied CO2, while China and India are net exporters, the environmental – as well as the economic – impacts of carbon leakage are a natural concern of lawmakers.

Despite the high levels of attention that international competitiveness therefore receives in debates about domestic climate policies, economic research has consistently found that the actual competitiveness impacts of proposed domestic climate policies would not — in quantitative terms — constitute a major economy-wide economic issue for the United States, partly because differences in other costs of production (including labor and energy costs, without accounting for carbon constraints) across countries swamp differences in costs due to environmental policies, including prospective climate policies.

On the other hand, this is a real issue for some specific sectors, in particular, energy-intensive industries subject to international competition, such as aluminum, cement, fossil fuels, glass, iron and steel, and paper. More importantly, it is in any event a major (economy-wide) political issue.  So, it needs to be addressed in any domestic climate policy which is to be both meaningful and politically pragmatic.

How About Free Allowance Allocations?

The approach frequently proposed by policy makers and the approach utilized in the European Union for its Emission Trading Scheme, and discussed in a number of other countries for their planned cap-and-trade programs is generous and free allocation of allowances to specific sectors and companies.  This makes the receiving companies happy, but has no effect on their international competitiveness. This is because such a free grant of allowances is no different than cash, that is, a fixed subsidy. The allowances can be sold by the receiving companies, are as good as cash, and represent a lump-sum transfer from the government, not tied to carbon abatement efforts or production (and hence, in the language of economics, are infra-marginal subsidies rather than marginal incentives).

Since the subsidy has no effect on the company’s marginal cost of production (its supply function), it has no effect on international competitiveness. The company will continue to find it as challenging as it did without the subsidy to produce cement, steel, or whatever at a price that can compete with companies located in countries without climate policies (apart from liquidity effects, which are minor in most cases). And the domestic company will have the same incentives as previously to locate its next production facility in a country without a climate policy.

A Potentially Effective Approach:  Output-Based Updating Allocations

With proper design, allowance allocations can be used effectively to address leakage and competitiveness.  If the free allocation of allowances is tied to the company’s production level, then it does affect marginal production costs, and therefore does affect competitiveness. Such a “home rebate” can thereby reduce leakage. This is, in fact, the approach taken in the Waxman-Markey legislation, and it is a potentially effective means to address concerns about international competitiveness for a select set of energy-intensive trade-sensitive sectors.

There are, however, some legitimate concerns about this approach of linking annual allowance allocations with production levels, as I wrote in my previous post, “The Wonderful Politics of Cap-and-Trade: A Closer Look at Waxman-Markey.” Such output-based updating allocations can provide perverse incentives and thereby drive up the costs of achieving a cap. This is because an output-based updating allocation is essentially a production subsidy. This distorts firms’ pricing and production decisions in ways that can increase the cost of meeting an emissions target.

Think of it this way. On the one hand, the cap-and-trade system is (sensibly) increasing the cost of using carbon-intensive fuels and emitting CO2 into the atmosphere. An aluminum producer, for example, is therefore paying more for the (fossil-fuel generated) electricity it uses, driving up its cost of production. At the same time, the government hands a subsidy to the company for each unit of aluminum it produces, working at cross-purposes with the energy-pricing incentive, and thereby driving up the aggregate social costs of achieving the cap. In addition, these home rebates do not distinguish between competition from countries with and without domestic climate policies.

The Key Question

So, there are problems with output-based updating allocations, but the key question in the real world of legislative design is whether better approaches are available?  The answer – in my view – is that there are several other available approaches, but they are not any better; and indeed, they appear to be significantly worse.

An Alternative Approach:  Import Allowance Requirements

One alternative approach is an import allowance requirement, whereby imports of highly carbon-intensive goods (in terms of their manufacture) must hold allowances for the U.S. cap-and-trade system, mirroring requirements on U.S. sources, if those imports come from countries which have not taken comparable climate policy actions. Note that this approach – which is referred to as a border adjustment, and is an implicit border tax – differentiates according to the country of origin.  In principle, this approach can maintain a level playing-field between imports and domestic production, reduce leakage, and possibly help induce key developing countries to take domestic action to avoid the implicit border tax on their products.

The import allowance requirement approach has its own problems, however. First, it focuses exclusively on imports into the United States, and has no effect on the competitiveness of U.S. exports. Second, it may not be compliant with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, because it would discriminate among trading nations (I’ll leave that issue for trade economists and trade lawyers to analyze and debate).

Third, it is questionable whether it would be effective as an inducement for developing countries to join an international agreement to reduce emissions. Why is that? Think about China, for example. China is the largest producer of cement in the world, accounting for almost 50% of world output. It is also the world’s largest exporter of cement. This may sound as though the threat of import allowance requirements in the U.S. and European cap-and-trade systems would be a powerful incentive for China to undertake emission reductions at home in order to avoid the border tax on its cement exports.  But China consumes 97% of its cement domestically, exporting only 3%, and much of that to developing countries. So, would a country such as China be willing to increase the costs of producing 97% of its output in order to protect a market for 1% or 2% of its production?(To be fair, for small developing countries for which their exports of a given product are a large share of their total output, the message could potentially be quite different.)

Despite these three problems with the import-allowance-requirement approach, note that it was a key part of the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act in the U.S. Senate in 2008, and may re-appear when serious debate commences in the Senate on climate legislation later this year. Also, it should be noted that this approach of import-allowance-requirements is included as a long-term backstop in Waxman-Markey if the President determines by 2022 that the output-based allocation mechanism is insufficient for some of the energy-intensive trade-sensitive sectors (and if a number of stringent conditions are met; see the “International Reserve Allowance Program” in the bill).

Other Possible Approaches

Another potential approach is a border rebate for exports to level the playing field abroad, whereby the government rebates the value of emissions embodied in exports. Imports, however, would retain their competitive advantage at home, and there are problems with WTO compliance. Finally, there is full boarder adjustment, meaning a border (import) tax plus a border (export) subsidy. Here there are questions not only about consistency with international trade law, but also concerns about feasibility. In some cases, there are tremendous challenges of calculating the embodied emissions of foreign products, and more generally, there are difficulties of defining and enforcing reliable rules of origin.

The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

Thus, none of these approaches are ideal, not home rebates as in Waxman-Markey, nor implicit border taxes on exports as in Lieberman-Warner, nor border rebates, nor full border adjustments.  As I said at the outset, the only real solution to the international competitiveness issue in the long term is to bring non-participating countries within an international climate regime in meaningful ways. (On this, please see the work of the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements.) But that solution is fundamentally outside of the scope of the domestic policy action of any individual nation, including the United States.

So, among the feasible set of options to address international competitiveness concerns – if only imperfectly and at some cost – which is best? The two live political options appear to be the output-based updating allocation mechanism in the Waxman-Markey legislation and the import allowance requirement, typically associated with the former Lieberman-Warner bill. At this time, meaning in the short term, I would be more worried about the potential damage to the international trade regime that import allowance requirements could foster than about the incremental social costs that an output-based updating allocation mechanism will create.

This is a political problem without a perfect solution (other than bringing all key countries into a meaningful international climate agreement).  For now, the domestic political process has done a credible job of patching together a set of interim solutions. Among the range of possible approaches of trying to level the international economic playing field, none is without its flaws, but the approach taken in the Waxman-Markey legislation appears best.  Subject to possible improvements on the House floor or in the Senate, the Waxman-Markey approach of combining output-based updating allocations in the short term for select sectors with the option in the long term of a Presidential determination (under stringent conditions) for import allowance requirements for specific countries and sectors seems both sensible and pragmatic.

A Broader Question:  Should the U.S. Enact a Domestic Climate Policy without a New, Sound International Climate Agreement in Place?

Stepping back from the specific policy design question, the broader argument has been made (indeed until a few years ago I was among those making it) that there should be no serious movement on a U.S. domestic climate policy until a meaningful and sensible (post-Kyoto) international agreement has been negotiated and ratified.  It is natural for questions to be raised about the very notion of the U.S. adopting a policy to help address a global problem. The environmental benefits of any single nation’s reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are spread worldwide, unlike the costs. This creates the possibility that some countries will want to “free ride” on the efforts of others. It’s for this very reason that international cooperation is required.

That is the why the U.S. is now vigorously engaged in international negotiations, and the credibility of the U.S. as a participant, let alone as a leader, in shaping the international regime is dependent upon our demonstrated willingness to take actions at home. Europe has already put its climate policy in place, and Australia, New Zealand, and Japan are moving to have their policies in place within a year. If the United States is to play a leadership role in international negotiations for a sensible post-Kyoto international climate regime, the country must begin to move towards an effective domestic policy – with legislation that is timed and structured to coordinate with the emerging post-Kyoto climate regime.

Without evidence of serious action by the U.S., there will be no meaningful international agreement, and certainly not one that includes the key, rapidly-growing developing countries.  U.S. policy developments can and should move in parallel with international negotiations.

The Bottom Line

So, like any legislation, the Waxman-Markey bill has its share of flaws. But it represents a solid foundation for a domestic climate policy that can help place the United States where it ought to be – in a position of international leadership to develop a global climate agreement that is scientifically sound, economically rational, and politically acceptable to the key nations of the world.

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