Category: Positive Political Economy

Unpacking EPA’s Decision to Rescind the Endangerment Finding

On February 12th, 2026, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finalized its rescission of the 2009 Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding.  This action by the Trump administration reversed the scientific determination that greenhouse gases (GHGs) threaten public health and welfare, effectively removing the legal basis for federal regulations on GHG emissions from vehicles, power plants, and other sources. This has received a great deal of press coverage, but to really understand the implications, it is helpful to understand the gestation and evolution of the Endangerment Finding.  And for that there is no one better in the world to guide us through the political and legal history, and the path going forward, than my colleague, Jody Freeman, the Archibald Cox Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.  Our conversation is featured in the latest episode of my podcast series, “Environmental Insights: Discussions on Policy and Practice from the Harvard Environmental Economics Program.” Listen to our conversation here.

When the Trump administration announced in July 2025 its intention to rescind the Endangerment Finding, it based that upon both legal and scientific grounds, in particular an exceptionally flawed study authored by five rather prominent climate skeptics and published by the U.S. Department of Energy.  Apparently the administration came to realize that the claimed scientific basis for rescission would be challenged successfully in court, and so when the recission was actually finalized a couple of weeks ago, the administration explicitly excluded the scientific grounds (and the DOE study), presumably realizing they would lose in court.  Instead, the recission is being justified on purely legal grounds.  For example, the argument is made that the Clean Air Act “does not authorize the Agency to prescribe emission standards in response to global climate change concerns.”  Also, the claim is made that the 2022 Supreme Court decision striking down the Obama power plant rule prohibits EPA from regulating global pollutants.  These legal arguments mean that future administrations cannot limit GHG emissions without new legislation by Congress.  So, clearly, Professor Freeman is a perfect person to unpack all of this.

I began our conversation by asking about the history of the Endangerment Finding, which Jody Freeman explained emerged from the verdict in the 2007 Massachusetts vs. EPA Supreme Court case in which the court ruled that GHGs are pollutants that could be covered by the Clean Air Act if EPA found that these gases “endanger public health and welfare.”

“The Obama administration took the scientific analysis that EPA had already done, updated it, and made the endangerment finding for greenhouse gases,” she notes.  “The first set of standards was for emissions from new cars and trucks under section 202 of the law. Interestingly, that is the section that the Trump administration now is claiming it does not have the authority under to make this endangerment finding or set these car [fuel efficiency] standards.”

Freeman explains that the Trump administration is also contending that it would be futile to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles because the emissions from new cars and trucks are a very small fraction of overall emissions.

“This really is a rehash of the losing arguments in Massachusetts versus EPA,” she points out.  “They look slightly different. They’re articulated slightly differently, but the heart of it is the same. So, in my view, they’re really taking another run at the losing side of the argument.”

The administration’s strategy, Freeman suggests, is based on the calculation that today’s Supreme Court will likely be much more sympathetic to their arguments than was the Court as it existed in 2007.

“It’s a risky thing for this administration to now take a run at it, but I speculate that their thinking is, well, we have three justices on the Supreme Court… who were in the dissent in Mass. versus EPA, including the Chief Justice, and all of the members of the majority from Massachusetts versus EPA are gone… and we have a new conservative Supreme Court, maybe we can pick up a couple of other votes and it’s worth taking a run at it,” she says.

Not surprisingly, Freeman finds it difficult to predict how the high court will rule, but she provides several possibilities.

“I can imagine a place where the Supreme Court might land where it doesn’t quite say that EPA lacks authority to regulate global pollution because that would contradict what it said in Mass. versus EPA, but it’s possible they would find something in the language of contribution to rule for the administration. I don’t think that would be the right reading of the law, but I certainly think EPA is hoping for it.”

But either way, Freeman argues, it will likely be several years before a final verdict is rendered.

“Even if this does reach the Supreme Court, it will be quite some time, and it will pretty much run out the clock on the administration,” she says. “So, we’re not going to see any greenhouse gas rules likely from this administration between now and the time they leave office.”

Finally, should the high court eventually rule for the administration, Freeman explains, the federal government would be virtually powerless to regulate emissions.

“That would knock out the Clean Air Act as a source of federal climate regulations because if they can’t make an endangerment finding [applicable] for cars and trucks, then they can’t make an endangerment finding anywhere in the Clean Air Act [in order to] regulate global pollution. So, if the court were to go for that argument, then Congress would need to amend the law to restore EPA’s authority to set greenhouse gas standards.”  Sobering but honest thoughts.

For this and much, much more, I encourage you to listen to this 73rd episode of the Environmental Insights series, with future episodes scheduled to drop each month.  You can find a transcript of our conversation at the website of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program.  Previous episodes have featured conversations with:

  • Gina McCarthy, former Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
  • Nick Stern of the London School of Economics discussing his career, British politics, and efforts to combat climate change
  • Andrei Marcu, founder and executive director of the European Roundtable on Climate Change and Sustainable Transition
  • Paul Watkinson, Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
  • Jos Delbeke, professor at the European University Institute in Florence and at the KU Leuven in Belgium, and formerly Director-General of the European Commission’s DG Climate Action
  • David Keith, professor at Harvard and a leading authority on geoengineering
  • Joe Aldy, professor of the practice of public policy at Harvard Kennedy School, with considerable experience working on climate change policy issues in the U.S. government
  • Scott Barrett,  professor of natural resource economics at Columbia University, and an authority on infectious disease policy
  • Rebecca Henderson, John and Natty McArthur University Professor at Harvard University, and founding co-director of the Business and Environment Initiative at Harvard Business School.
  • Sue Biniaz, who was the lead climate lawyer and a lead climate negotiator for the United States from 1989 until early 2017.
  • Richard Schmalensee, the Howard W. Johnson Professor of Management, and Professor of Economics Emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
  • Kelley Kizier, Associate Vice President for International Climate at the Environmental Defense Fund.
  • David Hone, Chief Climate Change Adviser, Shell International.
  • Vicky Bailey, 30 years of experience in corporate and government positions in the energy sector. 
  • David Victor, professor of international relations at the University of California, San Diego.
  • Lisa Friedman, reporter on the climate desk at the The New York Times.
  • Coral Davenport, who covers energy and environmental policy for The New York Times from Washington.
  • Spencer Dale, BP Group Chief Economist.
  • Richard Revesz, professor at the NYU School of Law.
  • Daniel Esty, Hillhouse Professor of Environment and Law at Yale University. 
  • William Hogan, Raymond Plank Research Professor of Global Energy Policy at Harvard.
  • Jody Freeman, Archibald Cox Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.
  • John Graham, Dean Emeritus, Paul O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University.
  • Gernot Wagner, Clinical Associate Professor at New York University.
  • John Holdren, Research Professor, Harvard Kennedy School.
  • Larry Goulder, Shuzo Nishihara Professor of Environmental and Resource Economics, Stanford University.
  • Suzi Kerr, Chief Economist, Environmental Defense Fund.
  • Sheila Olmstead, Professor of Public Affairs, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, Austin.
  • Robert Pindyck, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Professor of Economics and Finance, MIT Sloan School of Management.
  • Gilbert Metcalf, Professor of Economics, Tufts University.
  • Navroz Dubash, Professor, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.
  • Paul Joskow, Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics emeritus, MIT.
  • Maureen Cropper, Distinguished University Professor, University of Maryland.
  • Orley Ashenfelter, the Joseph Douglas Green 1895 Professor of Economics, Princeton University.
  • Jonathan Wiener, the William and Thomas Perkins Professor of Law, Duke Law School.
  • Lori Bennear, the Juli Plant Grainger Associate Professor of Energy Economics and Policy, Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University.
  • Daniel Yergin, founder of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, and now Vice Chair of S&P Global.
  • Jeffrey Holmstead, who leads the Environmental Strategies Group at Bracewell in Washington, DC.
  • Daniel Jacob, Vasco McCoy Family Professor of Atmospheric Chemistry & Environmental Engineering at Harvard.
  • Michael Greenstone, Milton Friedman Distinguished Service Professor of Economics, University of Chicago.
  • Billy Pizer, Vice President for Research & Policy Engagement, Resources for the Future. 
  • Daniel Bodansky, Regents’ Professor, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University.
  • Catherine Wolfram, Cora Jane Flood Professor of Business Administration, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, currently on leave at the Harvard Kennedy School.
  • James Stock, Harold Hitchings Burbank Professor of Political Economy, Harvard University.
  • Mary Nichols, long-time leader in California, U.S., and international climate change policy.
  • Geoffrey Heal, Donald Waite III Professor of Social Enterprise, Columbia Business School.
  • Kathleen Segerson, Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of Economics, University of Connecticut.
  • Meredith Fowlie, Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics, U.C. Berkeley. 
  • Karen Palmer, Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future.
  • Severin Borenstein, Professor of the Graduate School, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley.
  • Michael Toffel, Senator John Heinz Professor of Environmental Management and Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School.
  • Emma Rothschild, Jeremy and Jane Knowles Professor of History, Harvard University.
  • Nathaniel Keohane, President, C2ES.
  • Amy Harder, Executive Editor, Cypher News.
  • Richard Zeckhauser, Frank Ramsey Professor of Political Economy, Harvard Kennedy School.
  • Kimberly (Kim) Clausing, School of Law, University of California at Los Angeles
  • Hunt Allcott, Professor of Global Environmental Policy, Stanford Doerr School of Sustainability.
  • Meghan O’Sullivan, Jeane Kirkpatrick Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School.
  • Robert Lawrence, Albert Williams Professor of International Trade and Investment, Harvard Kennedy School.
  • Charles Taylor, Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School.
  • Wolfram Schlenker, Ray Goldberg Professor of the Global Food System, Harvard Kennedy School.
  • Karen Fisher-Vanden, Professor of Environmental & Resource Economics, Pennsylvania State University
  • Max Bearak, climate and energy reporter, New York Times
  • Vijay Vaitheeswaran, global energy and climate innovation editor, The Economist
  • Joseph Aldy, Teresa & John Heinz Professor of the Practice of Environmental Policy, Harvard Kennedy School
  • Nicholas Burns, Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations, Harvard Kennedy School
  • Elaine Buckberg, Senior Fellow, Salata Institute for Climate and Sustainability, Harvard University
  • Anna Russo, Junior Fellow, Harvard University
  • John Podesta, Advisor to Presidents Clinton, Obama, and Biden
  • Catherine Wolfram, William Barton Rogers Professor of Energy Economics, MIT Sloan School of Management

“Environmental Insights” is hosted on SoundCloud, and is also available on iTunes, Pocket Casts, Spotify, and Stitcher.

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“Time Flies When You’re Having Fun”

This blog post is quite a departure from my typical ones about climate change economics and policy and/or my latest podcast.  It’s actually stimulated by comments that were offered by my colleague, Jim Stock, at the conclusion of this past Wednesday’s Harvard Seminar in Environmental Economics and Policy. 

At the beginning of the seminar, before introducing the day’s excellent presenter, Anna Russo, I announced two changes/improvements in the Seminar starting in the spring semester.  One is that after 35 years of hosting the seminar series – first solo for 2 years, then 28 years with Marty Weitzman, and most recently 5 years with Jim Stock (that’s 70 semesters and a total of more than 500 seminars) – I was delighted to state that my Harvard Kennedy School colleague, Wolfram Schlenker, had agreed to take over for me in the spring, and co-host the Seminar with Jim.  That’s one of two upgrades.  (No, I’m not retiring, and I will be teaching my environmental economics and policy course as usual in the spring semester).

The other upgrade is that it will become the Harvard-MIT Joint Seminar in Environmental Economics and Policy, meeting every week on Thursdays, 4:30-5:45 pm, but alternating locations between Harvard and MIT.  The first seminar in the spring semester will be on Thursday, February 5th.

At the end of Wednesday’s seminar, after Anna’s presentation, I made my usual closing comment that the spring semester schedule will be sent out soon.  But before I could stand up to leave, Jim Stock surprised me (and presumably others in the room) by standing up, moving to the front of the room, and expressing his thanks for my having founded and led the Seminar for the past 35 years (as well as making some broader, very generous comments about my contributions to environmental economics and policy at Harvard and beyond).  Jim knows that I am resistant to being acknowledged publicly, let alone celebrated, so I’m not going to compound matters by repeating any of it here.

So, then, what’s the reason for this blog post today?  It’s quite simple.  When Jim spoke at the end of the seminar, he read a list of the authors and papers from the very first semester that I had co-hosted with Marty Weitzman in the fall of 1992, and it turned out that the list included two future Nobel laureates, Bill Nordhaus and Bob Solow (plus one who should have been – in my view – Marty himself). 

I’ve inserted the schedule below for your reading pleasure.  Topics in environmental economics at that time were clearly much broader than today, when the profession is focused (albeit not exclusively) on climate change.  For some of you, reviewing the schedule below will bring back memories, but I hope for everyone, it will be of interest.

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Key Takeaways from COP30 in Belém

The 30th Conference of the Parties (COP30) of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held in Belém, Brazil, concluded last week, and so – as I have done every year for about 20 years, I will offer my personal views about major takeaways from COP30.

Let’s begin by recognizing that the “Belém Package” was adopted, in which 195 Parties approved a broad set of nearly 30 individual decisions that cover many elements of international climate change policy going forward.

But what about specifics?  As always, there’s good news and bad news.  This year, I will begin with what I think of as disappointments and problematic outcomes, and then I will turn to one potentially very important outcome, which I don’t think has been sufficiently covered by much of the news media.

Disappointments and Problematic Outcomes

A Missing Statement about Phasing Out Fossil Fuels       

As was the case with COP29 post-mortems last year, the press has focused in its COP30 coverage on the conference’s final statement (or lack thereof) regarding the future of fossil fuels.  A year ago, I wrote at this blog about why such focus on what is at best a non-binding resolution was misplaced and given too much attention (What Happened at COP29 in Baku?, November 29, 2024).  This year, attention has again been focused unduly on the fact that the COP’s closing statement did not go beyond or even explicitly endorse the CO28 statement about “transitioning away from fossil fuels”, about which I also wrote at this blog (What Really Happened at COP-28 in Dubai, December 15, 2023).

So, there’s been abundant hand-wringing that the final COP30 language was weaker than many had hoped, and certainly did not include a formal fossil-fuel phase-out roadmap.  I won’t argue that such symbolic pronouncements, when made, are irrelevant, but the fact remains that these statements are only aspirational, and not tied in any meaningful way to the heart of the Paris Agreement’s implementation, namely the 195 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

What Happened to the Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF)?

On November 6, 2025, the COP President, André Corrêa do Lago, formally launched this initiative to pay for tropical countries to conserve standing forests.  With support from Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, expectations were high, with the ultimate target being a fund of $125 billion.  But the funding committed at COP 30, somewhat less than $7 billion, was less than expected.

The Just Transition Mechanism

A new “Belém Action Mechanism for Just Transition” is intended to provide a structured, multilateral framework to manage the transition from carbon-intensive economies to low-carbon economies in a just, equitable, inclusive way that protects workers, communities, and vulnerable populations. This is an important issue, because not only does climate change bring about economic damages, but so do climate change policies.  

The Belém text seems to refer only to developing countries, but since the time of COP3 in 1997 (where the Kyoto Protocol was adopted), the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) — a coalition of oil-exporting Arab states — has pushed for compensation for economic losses to the oil trade triggered by mitigation policies.  So, this new mechanism could have some significant unintended consequences.

The Global Implementation Accelerator

This was launched in Belém to quickly start high-impact, short-term climate actions, such as for reducing methane emission and implementing nature-based carbon removal. This is clearly meritorious, but what will the “Accelerator” actually do?  It is fundamentally voluntary, and requires significant finance.  So, it remains little more than a statement of intentions, unless this leads to national plans which are anchored in clear paths for finance & implementation.

Tripling Adaptation Finance

Countries committed in Belém to triple adaptation finance by 2035 to help vulnerable nations.  This means raising the adaptation finance target from roughly $40 billion/year (set in 2021) to about $120 billion per year by 2035.  The Paris Agreement is largely about mitigation (via the NDCs), and recently an ex post fund for Loss and Damage was launched.  But between these is the need for adaptation (It’s Not Too Soon to Take Climate Change Adaptation Seriously, November 7, 2021).  So the increased attention is merited, but there is no indication of a credible pathway that would unlock private capital and innovation, which is surely needed.

A Potentially Very Important Outcome

The negotiators in Belém launched a “Trade-Climate Dialogue” with a two-year work program on how international trade can support equitable climate action.  This, in my judgement, is potentially very important, partly because of the topic and partly because an actual program of work is specified for the countries to undertake.

A few days ago, I discussed this (plus the four concerns I’ve outlined above) with an excellent journalist from Newsweek – Jeff Young, the magazine’s Environment and Sustainability Editor.  I thought that some of my responses might make it into the article he was intending to write about CO30 outcomes, but it turned out that he published what is essentially an interview (not about my four concerns with COP30, but exclusively focused on the “potentially very important outcome” of COP30.  So, rather than summarizing or revising his prose and my responses to his questions, I am simply offering below Jeff Young’s article, which I hope you’ll find of interest.

Harvard Economist Cites ‘Important’ COP30 Development on Climate and Trade

Nov 25, 2025

By Jeff Young

Environment and Sustainability Editor

The COP30 climate talks launched two weeks ago amid high expectations for progress in Belém, Brazil. After 10 years of the Paris Climate Agreement, new national commitments to cut greenhouse gases were due and momentum was building for an international plan to phase out the world’s use of fossil fuels.

Further, the COP30 setting at the mouth of the Amazon River stressed the importance of forests and nature conservation in the climate fight, and Brazil was set to unveil a new way to fund forest protections.

But early signs of progress at the talks seemed to bog down in the tropical heat. By the time negotiators took up the idea of a “road map” to phase out fossil fuels, a fire in the venue forced a temporary evacuation and offered fitting symbolism for a COP going down in flames.

On Saturday, the talks closed with mixed results at best: financing for forests grew but not to the hoped-for levels; national plans still came short of the Paris target; and the COP30 final document did not call for new action to end fossil fuels.

“My own judgment is that the outcomes were a combination of disappointing, problematic and potentially important,” Harvard economist and veteran COP observer Robert Stavins told Newsweek. Stavins directs both the Harvard Environmental Economics Program and the school’s Project on Climate Agreements and he has attended close to 20 of the annual United Nations climate gatherings.

Stavins said that with the Trump administration abandoning the Paris Agreement and ignoring COP30 (for the first time in COP history, the U.S. did not send an official delegation), the realistic expectations for a strong outcome were low.

However, he said, COP30 produced a “potentially important” development on global trade and climate, a relatively new topic in the COP process.

The European Union has tied trade to climate action with the adoption of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), a means of pricing the greenhouse gas emissions involved in the manufacturing of many products the E.U. imports. In effect, CBAM is a CO2 tariff on carbon-intensive products, including iron and steel, aluminum, cement, fertilizers, hydrogen, and electricity.

In this interview, edited for length and clarity, Stavins said a dialogue on trade launched at COP30 could serve to overcome some objections to the CBAM and encourage other countries to take a similar approach to pricing carbon pollution.

Newsweek: Tell me about what you found “potentially important” coming out of COP30.

Robert Stavins: They established what is called a trade and climate dialogue. Obviously, the relationship between international trade and climate change is extremely important and one can view it in lots of ways. Some countries are very hostile towards the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism in the European Union and feel that it’s a way of keeping developing countries mired in poverty through what is essentially environmental protectionism.

The Europeans obviously view it as both necessary for establishing a level playing field but also as a way of inducing other countries to take on domestic carbon pricing mechanisms in order to escape the tariff when they export those specific bulk products: iron and steel and cement, aluminum, a few others, into the European Union.

What’s striking is that they agreed to start a 2-year work program on how international trade can support equitable climate action. Well, once they start a program, then they have to meet and talk about it, they have to put things on paper, so this one actually does have a bit of meat.

There was interest expressed from the Brazilian presidency going into the COP in the notion of something broader than the CBAM:  A number of countries putting in place carbon pricing domestic mechanisms—whether it’s a carbon tax or auctioned allowances under cap and trade—keeping the revenue and then putting in place essentially trade barriers like the CBAM on non-participating countries. In other words, expanding the CBAM into something like a carbon pricing club.

[For this blog essay, let me add that I am referring above to the “Open Coalition on Compliance Carbon Markets,” proposed by Brazil’s Finance Ministry ahead of COP30, initially with 11 supporting parties (Brazil, China, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Chile, Germany, Mexico, Armenia, Zambia, and France), and having since expanded to 18 parties.  More to the point, a very promising potential avenue forward for such a coalition (club) is provided by a recent proposal from the Global Climate Policy Project at Harvard and MIT, namely “Building a Climate Coalition: Aligning Carbon Pricing, Trade, and Development,” which I’m pleased to say is the focus of my upcoming podcast episode (and related blog essay) featuring Professor Catherine Wolfram of the MIT-Sloan School of Management.]

Newsweek: That reminds me that Senator Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, the top Democrat on the environment committee, was the sole federal U.S. representative there in Belém and this was one of his top talking points. He called the CBAM “a lifeboat” for climate safety, and I’m wondering if you agree with that assessment.

Stavins: I think it is. I originally saw it as an understandable reaction, trying to make European industry happy, so that they wouldn’t be at a competitive disadvantage. But I was very skeptical of the possibility of it actually inducing other countries to put in place carbon pricing mechanisms. But I was wrong, because in fact other countries are in that process.

Turkey has been completely upfront about the fact that they’re developing a carbon price mechanism for the explicit purpose of not having to pay the CBAM. And I can tell you that I think it’s five other countries that are also developing plans—I can’t comment on some because I’ve been working with them, so it’s confidential. So, to me, that is a potentially very promising development, but I say potentially because, you know, there are a lot of caveats.

Newsweek: One of the caveats there might be what the Trump administration will do in response to this.

Stavins: Obviously, tariffs have been essential to the first ten months of the Trump administration’s policies. Leading up to COP30, the Trump administration tried with several other countries to get them to back down on their NDCs [national commitments to cut CO2 emissions]. And the way they did it was to say, you know and we’ll look upon you favorably in terms of international trade if you do. That failed.

So rather than using trade barriers in a positive way, which I think is what the CBAM is, the Trump administration has been using them in regards to climate change in a negative way.

Newsweek: How big a deal was it that the U.S. wasn’t there? Did that create a sort of leadership void, and did others seek to fill that? I’m thinking of China in particular.

Stavins: The answer is yes. The overall effect is a change of mood. Leading up to the Paris Agreement, the U.S. and China were partners—we never would have gotten the Paris Agreement otherwise.

China now is happy to emerge into sole leadership. China now is emerging and in broader terms than just climate, it is in terms of all kinds of soft power as the U.S. pulls back with the cancelling of USAID and so much else.

Newsweek: What do you think of the future of the COP process itself? There are growing calls for reform to the process—do you see it changing, and do you think it remains relevant?

Stavins: I don’t see it going away because it has a huge constituency. Developing countries don’t walk out on it because they don’t want to jeopardize the process and see something like the G20 take over. So, for that reason, my opinion is that we will continue to have it for quite some time. It will become irrelevant only as an alternative parallel to it emerges and that could be what I described before but it might be something else, but I think it’s going to be with us for a while.

One last thing I’ll say is I would be more optimistic about COP31 in Turkey. Turkey is a very interesting place, they are a real bridge between Europe and Asia, obviously, and Australia is going to have some element of the [COP] presidency. Most importantly, I don’t think expectations are going to be high, and everything in life, whether it’s personal, institutional or political, is relative to expectations.

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