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Observations from Dubai Midway through COP-28

We’re half way through the 28^th Conference of the Parties (COP-28) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and so it’s a convenient time to assess developments. In a new podcast, I engage in conversation with Jonathan Banks, the global director of the Methane Pollution Prevention Program at the Clean Air Task Force (CATF).

This is a special mid-COP episode of “Environmental Insights: Discussions on Policy and Practice from the Harvard Environmental Economics Program,” which is produced by the Harvard Environmental Economics Program. Listen to the conversation here.

COP 28, which began on November 30^th and is scheduled to run through December 12^th, has featured a great deal of discussion on a variety of issues, but with an unprecedented amount of attention given to methane emissions and mitigation.

At the beginning of our conversation, Jonathan Banks states, “I’m just so amazed at how much attention and action I’ve seen on methane mitigation, and that’s a huge change because I’ve been coming to the COP for a long time, and we’ve never ever seen anything like this.”

Leading up to COP-28, there have been growing efforts to have countries incorporate methane reduction pledges into their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the terms of the Paris Agreement.

“Many times, countries will lump all greenhouse gases together and create one target for the total greenhouse gases, but the push has been to get explicit mentions of methane in their NDCs, and we’ve made a lot of progress in that space over the last year to get a really high percentage of members of the Global Methane Pledge with methane into their NDC,” Banks says. “The new push really is to go beyond that and to get countries to set specific targets for methane in their NDCs.”

In the recently announced Sunnylands Statement, the United States and China, two of the largest methane emitting countries, pledged to include methane emission pledges in their NDCs in the next round, representing one of the ways that bilateral and multilateral agreements can supplement the efforts taking place under the auspices of the UNFCCC.

Jonathan Banks notes that “for all its positives [the UNFCCC process] does have some faults in that it is extremely cumbersome. It is difficult to move things at any speed through that process, and speed is what we need when it comes to methane… The other day, Inger Andersen, the head of the United Nations Environment Program, described methane as our lifeboat and we have to take it. It is the thing that we need to do the fastest in order to start to bend the curve on methane emissions. And so being outside of the UNFCCC process at least gives the opportunity for greater speed.”

Banks says he is also encouraged by several announcements at COP-28 of major pieces of domestic legislation and regulation.

“The United States announced their final regulations for the oil and gas sector, which could achieve up to an 80 percent reduction from the regulated sources it will cover. We saw the Canadian government announce their draft regulations, which we’ll get about a 75 percent reduction from the oil and gas sector. And right before COP, we had the European Union finalize its regulations for oil and gas, and that also included, for the first time ever a methane import standard, which will apply to all gas that is bought and sold into the E.U.”

Much of the attention on methane up until now has focused on emissions from the oil and gas sector, partly because it the low-hanging fruit (low abatement cost sources) in many — but not all — jurisdictions around the world. But coal-bed methane, landfills (waste), and agriculture (both livestock and paddy rice) are very important in some countries. And as emissions from fossil fuels are cut, these other sources will become the predominant focus of policy. In particular, Banks emphasizes that there will be increased attention to the agriculture sector.

“2030 is when we need to hit our 30 percent reduction target to keep 1.5 [global temperature rise] in reach. But after 2030, most of the methane emissions reductions are going to need to come from the agriculture sector. That’s where the growth will be. That’s where we will have made the least progress,” he says. “Because the [mitigation] costs are typically high and then it’s just harder to deploy things, there really needs to be a lot of focus on developing more solutions and building out the science around this… Those are some big things [and I am excited to see] a lot more attention to this.”

On a broader issue of great consequence, Banks says he is also heartened by the improving relationship between the U.S. and China, which will most likely increase their cooperation on climate policy.

“What we saw for the last year and a half or so or almost two years is that China and the U.S. weren’t talking on climate or anything else, and that is never a good thing. When they’re not talking, we’re not making any progress. I know that [lead U.S. climate negotiator] John Kerry’s team put in a massive amount of work to develop the relationship again in a way that allows for the U.S. and China to speak and to reach agreement and make progress. I’m really excited about that,” he says.

For this and much more, I hope you’ll listen to our complete conversation in this 55^th episode of the Environmental Insights podcast series, with future episodes scheduled to drop each month. You can find a transcript of our conversation at the website of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program. Previous episodes have featured conversations with:

Gina McCarthy, former Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Nick Stern of the London School of Economics discussing his career, British politics, and efforts to combat climate change
Andrei Marcu, founder and executive director of the European Roundtable on Climate Change and Sustainable Transition
Paul Watkinson, Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Jos Delbeke, professor at the European University Institute in Florence and at the KU Leuven in Belgium, and formerly Director-General of the European Commission’s DG Climate Action
David Keith, professor at Harvard and a leading authority on geoengineering
Joe Aldy, professor of the practice of public policy at Harvard Kennedy School, with considerable experience working on climate change policy issues in the U.S. government
Scott Barrett, professor of natural resource economics at Columbia University, and an authority on infectious disease policy
Rebecca Henderson, John and Natty McArthur University Professor at Harvard University, and founding co-director of the Business and Environment Initiative at Harvard Business School.
Sue Biniaz, who was the lead climate lawyer and a lead climate negotiator for the United States from 1989 until early 2017.
Richard Schmalensee, the Howard W. Johnson Professor of Management, and Professor of Economics Emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Kelley Kizier, Associate Vice President for International Climate at the Environmental Defense Fund.
David Hone, Chief Climate Change Adviser, Shell International.
Vicky Bailey, 30 years of experience in corporate and government positions in the energy sector.
David Victor, professor of international relations at the University of California, San Diego.
Lisa Friedman, reporter on the climate desk at the The New York Times.
Coral Davenport, who covers energy and environmental policy for The New York Times from Washington.
Spencer Dale, BP Group Chief Economist.
Richard Revesz, professor at the NYU School of Law.
Daniel Esty, Hillhouse Professor of Environment and Law at Yale University.
William Hogan, Raymond Plank Research Professor of Global Energy Policy at Harvard.
Jody Freeman, Archibald Cox Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.
John Graham, Dean Emeritus, Paul O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University.
Gernot Wagner, Clinical Associate Professor at New York University.
John Holdren, Research Professor, Harvard Kennedy School.
Larry Goulder, Shuzo Nishihara Professor of Environmental and Resource Economics, Stanford University.
Suzi Kerr, Chief Economist, Environmental Defense Fund.
Sheila Olmstead, Professor of Public Affairs, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, Austin.
Robert Pindyck, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Professor of Economics and Finance, MIT Sloan School of Management.
Gilbert Metcalf, Professor of Economics, Tufts University.
Navroz Dubash, Professor, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.
Paul Joskow, Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics emeritus, MIT.
Maureen Cropper, Distinguished University Professor, University of Maryland.
Orley Ashenfelter, the Joseph Douglas Green 1895 Professor of Economics, Princeton University.
Jonathan Wiener, the William and Thomas Perkins Professor of Law, Duke Law School.
Lori Bennear, the Juli Plant Grainger Associate Professor of Energy Economics and Policy, Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University.
Daniel Yergin, founder of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, and now Vice Chair of S&P Global.
Jeffrey Holmstead, who leads the Environmental Strategies Group at Bracewell in Washington, DC.
Daniel Jacob, Vasco McCoy Family Professor of Atmospheric Chemistry & Environmental Engineering at Harvard.
Michael Greenstone, Milton Friedman Distinguished Service Professor of Economics, University of Chicago.
Billy Pizer, Vice President for Research & Policy Engagement, Resources for the Future.
Daniel Bodansky, Regents’ Professor, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University.
Catherine Wolfram, Cora Jane Flood Professor of Business Administration, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, currently on leave at the Harvard Kennedy School.
James Stock, Harold Hitchings Burbank Professor of Political Economy, Harvard University.
Mary Nichols, long-time leader in California, U.S., and international climate change policy.
Geoffrey Heal, Donald Waite III Professor of Social Enterprise, Columbia Business School.
Kathleen Segerson, Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of Economics, University of Connecticut.
Meredith Fowlie, Professor of Agricultural and Resource Economics, U.C. Berkeley.
Karen Palmer, Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future.
Severin Borenstein, Professor of the Graduate School, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley.
Michael Toffel, Senator John Heinz Professor of Environmental Management and Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School.
Emma Rothschild, Jeremy and Jane Knowles Professor of History, Harvard University.
Nathaniel Keohane, President, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES)

“Environmental Insights” is hosted on SoundCloud, and is also available on iTunes, Pocket Casts, Spotify, and Stitcher.

A Soup-to-Nuts Initiative to Reduce Global Methane Emissions

The mission of a new university-wide initiative at Harvard University is to develop and drive effective national and international policies to reduce emissions of methane, an exceptionally important greenhouse gas, by tapping the intellectual diversity and expertise of 17 Harvard faculty members across four departments of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences plus five professional schools, blending science, engineering, economics, political science, law, business, and policy studies.

As Principal Investigator, I have the privilege and pleasure of leading this effort, which is funded by one of five inaugural grants for multi-disciplinary, solutions-focused initiatives tackling the challenges posed by global climate change, awarded by Harvard’s new Salata Institute for Climate and Sustainability, as announced on February 13^th. The Salata Institute got its start in June 2022, and is supported by a $200 million gift from Melanie and Jean Eric Salata, as was featured in the Institute’s opening symposium in October 2022. The other funded “research clusters” focus on: Climate Adaptation in the Gulf of Guinea; Strengthening Communities; Climate Adaptation in South Asia; and Corporate Net-Zero Targets.

Methane has a short atmospheric lifetime and very high global warming potential, compared with carbon dioxide (CO₂). Therefore, methane-emissions abatement can significantly reduce concentrations, temperature, and damages, particularly in the short term. This could help give the world time to “bend the curve” on CO₂ emissions, conduct research on carbon removal, and, more generally, implement longer-term strategies to mitigate and adapt to climate change.

The ambitious goal of our Climate Research Cluster – “An End-to-End, Collaborative Strategy to Reduce Global Methane Emissions: Science, Engineering, Economics, Business, Policy, Law, Politics, Communications, and Action” – is to achieve meaningful and sustained progress in methane emissions reductions through research and effective engagement with key stakeholders. More specifically, we seek to deliver information that will facilitate the design and implementation of new and existing methane-emission-reduction policies and programs. Within our scope will be the major sectors from which methane is emitted, including the oil and gas sector, landfills, and agriculture.

We will conduct research, policy outreach, and public engagement along eight tracks:

Building on satellite-based measurement and attribution of emissions;
Identifying technologies that can best reduce emissions;
Applying insights from economic research and decision science to design policies that can best contribute to methane-emissions reduction;
Identifying legal and regulatory opportunities for and constraints to methane emissions reduction;
Defining and addressing key political issues constraining attempts to reduce methane emissions;
Defining roles that business can play in reducing methane emissions;
Identifying key international and multilateral opportunities for and constraints to reducing methane emissions; and
Undertaking historical examination of economic activities that result in methane emissions.

At every stage, we will facilitate frequent interactions among researchers in the various tracks, to build on synergies, advance cross-disciplinary understanding, and catalyze action. Moreover, the team is engaging policymakers in government and key leaders in business, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations to translate science into action. Such engagement will create two-way communications with policymakers and key constituencies and stakeholders, in a manner that translates into specific actions to reduce emissions.

The engagement process entails consultations with government officials and leading stakeholders at the international, regional, national, and sub-national levels. Faculty involved in this work are also focusing on translating their research into useful materials, such as videos and written briefs, which can be used by climate practitioners in the public and non-profit sectors to design and implement new emission-reduction strategies. Through targeted work with business leaders, this effort will seek to inform emissions reduction practices in target industries.

Our team brings together the work of seventeen different research groups from across Harvard, including four departments in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences (Earth and Planetary Science, Economics, Government, and History) and five professional schools (Harvard Business School, Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard Law School, and Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health). Thus, the faculty involved are approaching methane-emissions research from a range of disciplinary lenses, including those of science, engineering, economics, political science, law, business, history, and policy studies, producing a comprehensive approach. By communicating and collaborating across research teams, we intend for the whole to be greater than the sum of its parts, producing a holistic approach to policy solutions.

The participating faculty members include:

Joseph Aldy, Professor of the Practice of Public Policy (HKS)
Stephen Ansolabehere, Frank G. Thompson Professor of Government (FAS)
Jody Freeman, Archibald Cox Professor of Law (HLS)
Jeffry Frieden, Professor, Department of Government (FAS)
James Hammitt, Professor of Economics and Decision Sciences (HSPH)
Nathaniel Hendren, Professor of Economics (FAS)
John Holdren, Teresa and John Heinz Research Professor of Environmental Policy (HKS)
Daniel Jacob, Vasco McCoy Family Professor of Atmospheric Chemistry & Environmental Engineering (SEAS; FAS)
Carrie Jenks, Executive Director, Executive Director, Environmental and Energy Law Program (HLS)
Richard Lazarus, Howard and Katherine Aibel Professor of Law (HLS)
Meghan O’Sullivan, Jeane Kirkpatrick Professor of the Practice of International Affairs (HKS)
Forest Reinhardt, John D. Black Professor of Business Administration (HBS)
Robert Stavins, A.J. Meyer Professor of Energy and Economic Development (HKS)
Emma Rothschild, Jeremy and Jane Knowles Professor of History (FAS)
Dustin Tingley, Professor of Government (FAS)
Michael Toffel, Senator John Heinz Professor of Environmental Management (HBS)
Steven Wofsy, A.L. Rotch Professor of Atmospheric and Environmental Science (SEAS; FAS)

In addition, participating as an external collaborator is Mark Brownstein, Senior Vice President, Energy Transition, Environmental Defense Fund.

This is a true soup-to-nuts initiative, because we’re going from scientific detection and estimation of methane emissions all the way to public policy and communication with the public. We are excited to launch our activities; and as the work progresses, I will do my best to keep readers of this blog up to date.

What Really Happened at COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh?

The Twenty-Seventh Conference of the Parties (COP27) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held November 7-20 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, turned out to be important in several ways, but disappointing in others.

The Most Important Development During COP27 for Long-Term Climate Policy

Ever since Donald Trump was elected U.S. President in November 2016, a major question has been when would the United States and China return to the highly effective co-leadership they had played during the years of the Obama administration in the runup to the Paris Agreement. This was an important question at last year’s COP26 in Glasgow. It turned out that this year’s COP27 provided an answer, although in somewhat surprising fashion.

In my view, the most important development during COP27 held November 7-20 in Sharm El-Sheikh, took place six thousands miles away in Bali, Indonesia, when U.S. President Joe Biden and China President Xi Jinping met on November 14 on the sidelines of the G20 summit, shook hands, and engaged on in a three-hour conversation in which, among other topics, they signaled their return to the cooperative stance that had previously been so crucial for international progress on climate change. That three-hour meeting marked the end of the breakoff of talks that had been initiated by China in response to Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan in early August, and the two leaders’ intention to not allow disagreements regarding international trade, human rights, movement away from democracy in Hong Kong, and Taiwan’s security to contaminate their cooperation on climate change.

The discussion between the two heads of state quickly (and explicitly) trickled down to the heads of the respective negotiating teams at COP27 — John Kerry of the United States and Xie Zhenhua of China. They are longtime friends, but had not been engaged in discussions or cooperation on climate change because of the problems that had existed since August at the highest level between the two governments. After the Biden-Xi meeting in Bali, statements from both John Kerry and Xie Zhenhua indicated that the two countries will resume cooperation. I believe it is reasonable to anticipate that there may even be something of a return to the co-leadership on climate change policy which China and the United States had previously exercised, and which was absolutely essential for the successful enactment of the Paris Agreement (adopted by 196 Parties at COP21 in Paris, December 12, 2015, and entered into force on November 4, 2016), but cooperation that had disappeared long before Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan, namely with the beginning of the former Trump administration and throughout much of the first two years of the Biden administration.

The Most Contentious and Dramatic Decision at COP27

If the restart of China-U.S. climate cooperation was the most important development during the COP for long-term climate policy, the most dramatic and contentious decision reached within the halls of COP27 by the negotiators from 195 countries was the establishment of a fund for so-called “Loss and Damage,” an issue that has been kicked down the road since it was first floated in 1991 when Vanuatu, a small island nation in the Pacific, suggested the creation of a United Nations fund to help pay for the consequences of rising sea levels. For thirty years, action on this notion has been delayed, including with a clever approach in the Paris Agreement itself. One year ago, at the conclusion of COP26 in Glasgow, I predicted that this Loss & Damage issue would be the major focus of this year’s COP27. My predictions do not always come true, but this one did.

First, some background for those of you who are not UNFCCC/COP junkies. “Loss and Damage” refers to the range of impacts associated with climate change, since even if emissions are reduced to zero tomorrow morning, damages will continue due to the long lag time of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere, particularly CO₂ with its atmospheric half-life of more than 100 years. Most of the Paris Agreement targets reducing emissions (via the mechanism of the Nationally Determined Contributions), and the famous $100 billion commitment for finance from developed countries for developing countries targets mitigation and adaptation. But adaptation is not possible for all impacts – think about the very existence of small island states, or this year’s floods in Pakistan.

The controversy has been with regard to who should pay for such loss and damage, with the focus on those most responsible for climate change, namely the countries with the greatest contributions to the accumulated stock of GHGs in the atmosphere – the United States and other large, wealthy countries, plus – importantly – China.

This has been controversial because, on the one hand, it is absolutely (and understandably) viewed as essential by countries such as the small island states, whereas countries such as the USA, China, and the EU member states worry that talk of “loss and damage” raises the specter of compensation for bad weather and unlimited legal liability. Indeed, at some climate talks before the Paris Agreement (2015), debates on this issue nearly caused the talks to collapse.

But the issue was finessed in the Paris Agreement’s Article 8, which recognizes the importance of loss and damage, but then eliminates the most contentious aspects in Decision 52 (a document that accompanied the Paris Agreement), where the Parties agreed that loss and damage “does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation.” Understandably, some countries were not satisfied with this “resolution.”

The developing-country voices regarding loss and damage – this time favoring the creation of a new fund for loss and damage payments – were more prominent at COP26 last year than at any previous COP, but on the final day of the talks last year the wealthy countries blocked such proposals, and instead agreed to talk more about it in the future by setting up a “dialogue” on the issue in future COPs.

That brief history will convey the significance of what happened at COP27, when China, the European Union, and a few other developed countries came out in support of a loss & damage fund; and, then, as the second week of the COP was approaching its close, John Kerry announced that the U.S. also supported (in principle) the creation of such a fund, reversing its long-standing opposition. It’s important to note that the agenda item on Loss & Damage, which was adopted at the outset of COP27 (and was the basis for the Loss & Damage decision), was agreed on the understanding (in the report of the meeting) that Loss & Damage does not involve compensation or legal liability, and, furthermore, that understanding is cross-referenced in the preamble to the Loss & Damage decision. Hence, the important caveat from Decision 52 accompanying the Paris Agreement was reiterated in the Loss & Damage decision produced at COP27.

Such a fund could – on the demand side – eventually amount to trillions of dollars per year. Note that the World Bank has estimated that this year’s floods in Pakistan caused $40 billion in damages. However, on the supply side, the few quantitative financial pledges stated thus far are in the tens of millions of dollars. COP27 established a transition committee to develop recommendations on funding arrangements at COP28 in 2023. The transition committee will have a majority of developing country representatives (which may not be a prescription for a pragmatic and effective process).

So, is the new Loss and Damage Fund an empty shell? China is important, as the world’s largest emitter, but not the greatest contributor to the atmospheric stock of greenhouse gases, a title held by the United States. And damages are a function of the existing stock, not the emissions in any year. However, depending on relative rates of economic growth and other factors, China may become the largest contributor to the stock in a decade or two. China’s announced position at COP27 was that it supports the creation of the Loss and Damage Fund, but that as a “developing country” it will not be responsible for any contributions to the fund. By the way, China’s definition of itself as a “developing country” links to the 1992 list of non-Annex I countries under the UNFCCC, when China’s per capita GDP was less than $400/year. The fact that its per capita GDP has grown by 3,330% since then is not considered relevant by China.

Interestingly, there is some convergence on the Loss and Damage Fund between China and the United States, although certainly not in regard to China’s self-proclaimed exemption from financial contributor status. Rather, the U.S. has a story that winds up in a similar place. It goes like this. “We support the Loss & Damage fund, but due to the new Republican majority in the House of Representatives, it is impossible for us to make any commitment of new funding.” (Minor caveat: What about a quick move via inclusion in the Omnibus Budget Bill in December, before the Republicans take control? Not going to happen.)

So, is the new Loss and Damage Fund an empty shell, or is it a principled first step toward equitable allocation of responsibility under the Paris Agreement? It may be both. How it will evolve in the future is difficult to say.

Other Developments and Issues at COP27

There were plenty of other debates and developments at COP27, but in my view they were of secondary consequence compared with the Biden-Xi rapprochement and the establishment of the Loss & Damage fund.

Of course, the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, and the annual COPs are ultimately and mainly about reducing emissions of GHGs. There have been many statements in the popular press and from some of the delegations of disappointment because the COP27 closing statement did not fully embrace the 1.5 C target (relative to pre-industrial temperatures), versus 2 C target of the Paris Agreement, nor did it state the intention – in what is really no more than a non-binding resolution – to phase out not just “unabated coal,” as in the Glasgow decision, but all fossil fuels.

These are valid, indeed important concerns. But I remember when the Business-as-Usual (BAU) predictions from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) were as high as 7.0 C this century, then with Paris, 3 C; then with enhanced Paris & the Kigali amendments to the Montreal Protocol, 2.5 C; and now with the latest pledges from China and India, capping warming at 1.7 C this century may be feasible, according to the International Energy Agency. Much will depend upon future actions by the large emerging economies – China, India, Brazil, Korea, South Africa, Mexico, and Indonesia – as well as by the United States and other developed countries. But this COP need not cause excessive hang-wringing, let alone depression. This is a marathon, not a sprint.

Also, since I have written extensively – and worked at the annual COPs – on international linkage, trading, and Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, I should at least note that a variety of technical decisions regarding operationalizing the Article 6.2 mechanism were deferred to COP28. To some degree, this is good news, since developments with Article 6.2 since the Rulebook for it was completed at COP26 are not encouraging, nor are the interpretations of 6.2 that many policy participants seem to hold. More about this in the future.

In the meantime, there were also significant discussions and developments regarding a very important non-CO₂ GHG, namely methane. In this regard, in a previous blog post, I described a podcast conversation with my Harvard colleague, Professor Daniel Jacob, who specializes in this realm. And in my most recent previous blog post, I described my own activities and speaking engagements at COP27 regarding our work at Harvard on satellite-detection of methane concentrations, statistical estimation of related emissions, and development and implementation of appropriate public policies. This was an important focus of several bilateral meetings at COP27, as well as some of my speaking engagements (others were on carbon pricing). I’ll have more to say about our methane work and U.S. and global developments in future essays at this blog.

Next Year: COP28 in Dubai

This year was officially the “Implementation COP,” and next year’s COP28 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), is officially the “Global Stocktake COP.” But if COP27 was, in effect, the “Loss & Damage COP,” we might anticipate that the incoming UAE presidency of COP28 will make it the “Carbon Removal COP,” with renewed attention to carbon capture & storage, carbon capture & utilization, direct carbon removal, as well as solar radiation management. If that happens, it will be controversial, like loss & damage was, but for different reasons and with very different parties.

Photos from COP27

Finally, I’m including a few photos below from some of my speaking engagements and meetings. You can find more photos and stories about activities at COP27 of the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements here.