About the Author
Robert N. Stavins is the Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government, Director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program, and Chairman of the Environment and Natural Resources Faculty Group.
Tag Archives: RGGI
Low Prices a Problem? Making Sense of Misleading Talk about Cap-and-Trade in Europe and the USA
Some press accounts and various advocates have labeled the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) as near “the brink of failure” because of the recent trend of very low auction prices. Likewise, commentators have recently characterized the European Union Emission Trading … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Economic Policy, Economic Stimulus Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Politics, Positive Political Economy
Tagged cap-and-trade, cost-effectiveness, efficiency, environmental politics, EU ETS, European Union, global climate policy, green jobs, RGGI
14 Comments
AB 32, RGGI, and Climate Change: The National Context of State Policies for a Global Commons Problem
Why should anyone be interested in the national context of a state policy? In the case of California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32), the answer flows directly from the very nature of the problem — global climate change, the … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Natural Resource Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged AB 32, Best Available Control Technology, CAFE standards, cap-and-trade, carbon tax, carbon-pricing policy, cost-effectiveness, Dormant Commerce Clause, endangerment finding, environmental politics, free rider problem, global climate policy, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Lawrence Goulder, linkage of cap-and-trade systems, market failure, market-based environmental policies, Massachusetts v EPA, mobile source standards, National Bureau of Economic Research, new source performance standards, New Source Review, NIMBY, Obama Administration, Pavley standards, price collar, principal-agent problem, public goods, public nuisance, regulation, revenue-neutral taxes, RGGI, safety-valve, Stanford University, sulfur dioxide, Supreme Court, tailoring rule, technological change, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, Waxman-Markey legislation, Western Climate Initiative
Leave a comment
Eyes on the Prize: Federal Climate Policy Should Preempt State and Regional Initiatives
In just a few days, Senators John Kerry, Lindsey Graham, and Joe Lieberman will release their much-anticipated proposal for comprehensive climate and energy legislation – the best remaining shot at forging a bipartisan consensus on this issue in 2010. Their … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Assembly Bill 32, building codes, California, cap-and-trade, carbon dioxide, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, environmental politics, free rider problem, global climate policy, greenhouse gases, information problems, market failure, market-based environmental policies, Massachusetts, Obama Administration, preemption, principal-agent problem, regulation, RGGI, Senator Graham, Senator Kerry, Senator Lieberman, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, Waxman-Markey legislation, zoning
7 Comments