About the Author
Robert N. Stavins is the Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government, Director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program, and Chairman of the Environment and Natural Resources Faculty Group.
Tag Archives: information problems
On Becoming an Environmental Economist
My essay this month represents a departure from my standard blog posts about a contemporary environmental policy issue. Rather, it is of a more personal nature, and stems from the fact that the second volume of my collected papers has … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Corporate Social Responsibility, Economic Policy, Economic Stimulus Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Fisheries Policy, Forest Policy, Health Policy, Natural Resource Economics, Natural Resource Policy, Politics, Positive Political Economy, Water Policy, Wine Economics
Tagged benefit-cost analysis, cap-and-trade, common property resources, cost-effectiveness, distributional analysis, distributional equity, economic valuation, efficiency, environmental politics, free rider problem, global climate policy, information problems, Kyoto Protocol, linkage of cap-and-trade systems, market failure, market-based environmental policies, public goods, regulation, revenue-neutral taxes
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Economics of the Environment
The Sixth Edition of Economics of the Environment: Selected Readings has just been published by W. W. Norton & Company of New York and London. Through five previous editions, Economics of the Environment has served as a valuable supplement to … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Corporate Social Responsibility, Economic Policy, Economic Stimulus Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Fisheries Policy, Forest Policy, Natural Resource Economics, Natural Resource Policy, Politics, Positive Political Economy, Water Policy
Tagged Australia, benefit-cost analysis, Brazil, California, cap-and-trade, China, common property resources, cost-effectiveness, distributional analysis, distributional equity, economic valuation, efficiency, environmental politics, European Union, externalities, free rider problem, global climate policy, import allowance requirement, India, information problems, Japan, Korea, Kyoto Protocol, linkage of cap-and-trade systems, market failure, market-based environmental policies, Mexico, Obama Administration, Office of Management and Budget, public goods, regulation, revenue-neutral taxes, sulfur dioxide
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Both Are Necessary, But Neither is Sufficient: Carbon-Pricing and Technology R&D Initiatives in a Meaningful National Climate Policy
For many years, there has been a great deal of discussion about carbon-pricing – whether carbon taxes or cap-and-trade – as an essential part of a meaningful national climate policy. It has long been recognized that although carbon-pricing will be … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Economic Stimulus Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Natural Resource Economics, Natural Resource Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged ARPA-E, cap-and-trade, carbon pricing, carbon tax, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, David Leonhardt, efficiency, environmental politics, externalities, free rider problem, global climate policy, green jobs, information problems, market failure, market-based environmental policies, New York Times, Obama Administration, patents, public goods, R&D, regulation, revenue-neutral taxes, Robert Hahn, technological change, technology innovation, technology R&D policies, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, Wall Street Journal, Waxman-Markey legislation
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Eyes on the Prize: Federal Climate Policy Should Preempt State and Regional Initiatives
In just a few days, Senators John Kerry, Lindsey Graham, and Joe Lieberman will release their much-anticipated proposal for comprehensive climate and energy legislation – the best remaining shot at forging a bipartisan consensus on this issue in 2010. Their … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Positive Political Economy
Tagged Assembly Bill 32, building codes, California, cap-and-trade, carbon dioxide, Copenhagen Accord, cost-effectiveness, environmental politics, free rider problem, global climate policy, greenhouse gases, information problems, market failure, market-based environmental policies, Massachusetts, Obama Administration, preemption, principal-agent problem, regulation, RGGI, Senator Graham, Senator Kerry, Senator Lieberman, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, Waxman-Markey legislation, zoning
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Is Benefit-Cost Analysis Helpful for Environmental Regulation?
With the locus of action on Federal climate policy moving this week from the House of Representatives to the Senate, this is a convenient moment to step back from the political fray and reflect on some fundamental questions about U.S. … Continue reading
Posted in Climate Change Policy, Energy Economics, Energy Policy, Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy, Natural Resource Economics, Natural Resource Policy
Tagged benefit-cost analysis, cost-effectiveness, distributional analysis, distributional equity, economic valuation, efficiency, environmental politics, externalities, first welfare theorem, global climate policy, information problems, market failure, monetary values, Obama Administration, Office of Management and Budget, regulation, Regulatory Impact Analysis, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, uncertainty, Waxman-Markey legislation
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What Baseball Can Teach Policymakers
With the Major League Baseball season having just begun, I’m reminded of the truism that the best teams win their divisions in the regular season, but the hot teams win in the post-season playoffs. Why the difference? The regular season … Continue reading
Posted in Environmental Economics, Environmental Policy
Tagged baseball, benefit-cost analysis, cost-effectiveness, efficiency, information problems, Monte Carlo analysis, Nonroad Diesel Rule, Obama Administration, Office of Management and Budget, regulation, Regulatory Impact Analysis, uncertainty
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The Myth of the Universal Market
Communication among economists, other social scientists, natural scientists, and lawyers is far from perfect. When the topic is the environment, discourse across disciplines is both important and difficult. Economists themselves have likely contributed to some misunderstandings about how they think … Continue reading